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Now is the time for international lawyers to focus on the is-
sue of fairness in the law. The new maturity and complex-
ity of the system calls out for a critique of law's content and
consequences. Its extensive coverage and its audacious in-
cursions into state sovereignty demand a new emphasis on
the system's values, aims, and effects.'
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national Law Day Conference on October 30, 2004 and the Michigan State Univer-
sity College of Law Intellectual Property and Communications Law and Policy
Scholars Roundtable on January 27-28, 2006, where I presented various versions
of this article. I am particularly grateful for the contributions made by Peter Yu,
Roberta Kwall, Laurence Helfer, and James Gathii. I am also indebted to Ruth
Okediji and James Maxeiner for reviewing earlier drafts and providing valuable
comments. Finally, I am forever grateful to my colleagues, Jane Baron, Jeffrey
Dunoff, David Hoffman, Duncan Hollis, and Hank Richardson for providing
valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 9
(1995). Franck discusses how international law has evolved from a relatively
straightforward and uncomplicated area into one that is so mature and complex
that it requires specialization:
The time when any one scholar could give a definitive overview of the
whole of Public International Law is past. Nowadays, scholars and prac-
titioners choose to specialize in international contracts for the sale of
goods or in the law of treaties; international tort or criminal law; interna-
tional resource law or the law of human rights; aviation or law of the
seas; communications law or space law; sovereign or diplomatic immu-
nities; conflict of jurisdictions, or of intergenerational claims; unfair busi-
ness practices or unfair expropriations; international aspects of antitrust
laws or of international tax laws; the law of international organizations
or of international waterways. This specialization reflects the fact that
the law of the international community has, through maturity, acquired
complexity.
Id. at 5. In part, Franck attributes the explosion of international law into hereto-
fore unforeseen and unexpected areas to modern science and technology, which
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1. INTRODUCTION
Should fairness be considered in international law, as Franck
suggests? Consider the following three scenarios:
1. A poor, elderly woman purchases household goods
from a local retailer. The goods include items such as
draperies, a wallet, a bed, curtains, fans, a typewriter,
kitchen chairs, a washing machine, and a stereo. The
woman then purchases a new mattress from the same
retailer. The retailer presents the woman with a stan-
dard sales agreement that contains a "cross-collateral"
clause, which provides that if there is a single default on
the payment of the contract, the retailer can repossess
all of the goods, including goods previously purchased,
to secure the outstanding debt. The woman defaults on
one payment and the retailer repossess the mattress as
well as all of the goods already purchased. 2
2. An unsophisticated consumer purchases a car from an
automobile dealer. The sales representative presents
the consumer with a contract that contains a clause lim-
iting its liability in the event that the purchaser gets in-
jured because of a defect in the car. The car's brakes fail
and the consumer suffers serious injuries. The con-
sumer brings an action against the dealer for personal
injuries. The dealer, relying on the limitation of liability
clause, denies liability. 3
3. A small, unindustrialized country enters into an agree-
ment with a significantly larger, more industrialized
country. The agreement must be signed before the
small country is permitted to join an exclusive, wealth-
generating organization. The small country is facing an
epidemic of epic proportions. Already, twenty-two mil-
has "enabled a virtual leap of humanity into many new fields of activity which
require regulation." Id. at 6.
2 These facts are based on Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that courts should dismiss traditional norms of con-
tract law when parties with little bargaining power enter into unreasonable com-
mercial contracts).
3 This case is loosely based on Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d
69 (N.J. 1960) (holding that commercial sales have an implied warranty of mer-
chantability).
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lion of its citizens have died as a result of a deadly virus
and over thirty million of its citizens are infected. Al-
most three million die every year. Thirteen million
children are orphaned; 15,000 new people acquire the
virus every day. The average fifteen-year-old citizen
has more than a fifty percent chance of dying of the vi-
rus and is more likely to die of the virus than all other
causes combined. Finally, while the virus attacks indis-
criminately, it impacts the country's economic driving
force-its farmers, teachers, blue-collar workers, young
adults, and parents -particularly hard. The disease is
treatable, but at a cost well out of reach of the country's
citizens. The country attempts to address this crisis by
implementing two methods, parallel importation and
compulsory licensing, which will drastically reduce
prices and ensure the supply of drugs at affordable
prices. Upon enactment, the larger industrialized coun-
try demands that the smaller country halt implementa-
tion because the methods violate its obligations under
the agreement.
All of the scenarios above involve gross inequity in bargaining
power, leading to agreements presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it"
basis. Yet only in the first two scenarios, both of which involve in-
dividual parties and limited harms, are fairness arguments cogni-
zable defenses.
4
In the third scenario, international law, especially international
intellectual property law under the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS" or the "Agree-
ment"), fails to take into account underlying factual circumstances
and, more importantly, fairness. This is a mistake.
This article argues that it is undeniably appropriate to question
and evaluate whether international treaties are fair. In view of the
problems of interdependency, scarcity of resources, economic coer-
4 In many countries, notions of fairness are taken into account when the
terms of a contract unfairly advantage one party. In fact, many countries around
the world have domestic laws that protect disadvantaged parties in these situa-
tions because they have no ability to negotiate the terms of the agreement, have
no meaningful choice other than to agree to the terms stated by the party with su-
perior bargaining power, and sometimes have no real ability to comprehend the
terms. Courts use the doctrine of contracts of adhesion and the closely related
(and sometimes inextricably connected) concept of unconscionability to address
these unfair and oppressive "bargains." See infra Section 1.
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cion, and the effects of intellectual property on economic develop-
ment, access to essential foods, medicines, and public goods, and,
ultimately, sustainable development, notions of fairness should be
a paramount consideration in treaty interpretation.5
Much of the unfairness in international law results from severe
power inequalities among the various nations and the power-
based regime that undergirds global governance. The remedy for
treaties negotiated unfairly is quite often more treaties or, alterna-
tively, hollow talk of promoting national sovereignty. Neither of
these solutions directly attacks the problem. Indeed, there is lack
of political will among nations to address the structural defects and
power asymmetries in the international system. This article ad-
vances a different approach for dealing with the severely dispro-
portionate power disparities in international relations.
Using insights pulled from domestic contract law, the similari-
ties between contracts and treaties, and general principles of law
found in the laws of many nations, this article advocates applying
the contracts of adhesion doctrine to international agreements. The
contracts of adhesion doctrine allows judicial authorities, as a mat-
ter of law and public policy, to interpret contracts more favorably
to one party because, among other things, the contract is proce-
durally or substantively unfair. As applied to international agree-
ments, this approach challenges traditional discourse by recogniz-
ing and acknowledging the power disparities among countries and
developing a "treaties of adhesion" doctrine to address it.6
This article is divided into five sections. Section 1 sets forth the
contracts of adhesion doctrine. Generally speaking, these contracts
involve either an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
party or contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other
party. The doctrine demands that ambiguities in the contract be
construed against the drafter. At least at the domestic level, taking
5 See FRANCK, supra note 1. Franck argues that the degradation of the earth's
environment has forced individuals and governments to view humanity as a
"single gifted but greedy species" that requires a move from the traditional in-
quiry on whether international law is law to more pointed, important questions
about whether international law is effective, enforceable, understood, and, most
importantly, fair. Id. at 6.
6 See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, [udicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long a
Time is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 617-18 (1975) (noting how Native American
treaties are treated as contracts of adhesion, "liberally construed in favor of the
weaker party" in order to "achieve the reasonable expectations of the weaker
party").
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into account the unfairness of agreements, either because of proce-
dural infirmities or substantive inequity, is not novel. Many coun-
tries, including the United States, have employed this doctrine.
Indeed, "[r]ecognition that contract law should provide some
measure of protection against overreaching in contract terms is
near universal in modern legal systems."
7
Section 2 demonstrates why it is appropriate to apply this equi-
table doctrine to international treaties. Applying the doctrine to
international agreements, while introducing a new line of attack in
the scholarly debate on the consequences and capacity of interna-
tional law, differs in important respects from how conventional in-
ternational law analysis is applied, which posits that international
treaties are the result of bargained negotiation among sovereign
equals. The adhesion doctrine is appropriately applied to interna-
tional agreements if, as it is argued here, the doctrine is a general
principle of international law- that is to say, if it is found in a sig-
nificant number of the world's legal systems, and, accordingly,
represents binding authority for adjudicating international dis-
putes.
Putting theory into context, Section 3 analyzes TRIPS through
the lens of this doctrine and concludes that TRIPS is a treaty of ad-
hesion. In the decade. since its inception, many have concluded
that the Agreement is unfair to developing countries.8 This alleged
unfairness stems from the bargaining and negotiation process lead-
ing to the signing of the treaty. This unfairness threatens to un-
dermine the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), as developing
7 James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age:
European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109, 114 (2003).
8 Many of the difficulties created by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") provisions came to light when develop-
ing countries sought access to essential medicines protected by patents. In June
2001, the TRIPS Council convened a special session where many developing coun-
tries set forth their opposition to the treaty's terms. The lead paper was a submis-
sion on TRIPS and Public Health from the Africa Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. Among other
things, these developing countries complained that protecting patented drugs
drove the cost of necessary medicines outside the price range of the majority of
developing countries. Moreover, they argued that TRIPS provisions on compul-
sory licensing and parallel importation limited their ability to gain access to these
medicines. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WrO, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L.
469, 469 (2002) (declaring the united mission of developing countries to protect
their public health interests, even if that meant contravening TRIPS).
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countries question whether they should honor an agreement that
continues to harm them and provides them very little in terms of
countervailing benefits.9 Rather than dismantle the current inter-
national intellectual property system, this new interpretive cannon
seeks to rectify the lingering effects of the Agreement's unfair-
ness.10
Section 4 discusses the consequences that flow from the conclu-
sion that TRIPS is a treaty of adhesion. One possible consequence
is rescinding TRIPS. Doing so might bring the international intel-
lectual property community back to where it was in 1994, except
that countries negotiating intellectual property agreements now
fully understand the implications of accepting increased standards.
In view of the efforts to draft, negotiate, and implement TRIPS, this
outcome is highly unlikely. More likely, with the reasonable as-
sumption that TRIPS is here to stay, the international community -
in particular, WTO panels and the TRIPS Appellate Body-may
nevertheless take the Agreement's unfairness into account by using
9 See, e.g., Victor Mosoti, Does Africa Need the WTO Dispute Settlement System?,
http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2003-02-07/Mosoti.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) (noting that the costs of WTO membership may out-
weigh the benefits for some nations).
10 There is an increasing body of literature criticizing TRIPS. See, e.g., UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE (2003);
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotec-
tive, 29 VAND. I. TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996) (arguing that TRIPS is outdated because
it neglects to address the increase in the international, online intellectual property
market); Donald P. Harris, TRIPS' Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS
Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 99
(2004) (describing how TRIPS can have devastating effects on the developing
world, and, in turn, the developed world); Martin Kohr, How the South is Getting a
Raw Deal at the WTO, in VIEWS FROM THE SOUTH: THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION
AND THE WTO ON THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 7 (Sarah Anderson ed., 2000) (explain-
ing that many countries feel marginalized by the WTO); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS -
Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism", 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 415 (1996) (questioning whether TRIPS will have positive economic effects for
either developing or developed nations); Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the
Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819
(2003) (noting that the dispute settlement policy under TRIPS may adversely af-
fect domestic intellectual property policy). Others argue that unless developing
countries feel the game is fair or will benefit them, they simply will fail to com-
ply -even in light of the relatively harsh retaliatory sanctions. See, e.g., Peter M.
Gerhart, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory - TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 357 (2000). Finally, others argue that TRIPS is workable for
developing countries if interpreted appropriately. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman &
David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case For Ongoing Public-
Private Initiatives To Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 11 (1998).
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the treaty of adhesion doctrine to interpret its provisions more fa-
vorably to developing countries.1 In this section, the doctrine is
applied to specific TRIPS provisions. The application of the doc-
trine helps offset structural imbalances that lie underneath a WTO
dispute settlement system that favors its most powerful members.
2
Such an approach will rescue the international system, as it will
provide developing countries with discretion and flexibility in ad-
dressing social, economic, and political concerns. Additionally, it
will make these countries feel as if they are part of the international
deal and will ensure more compliance with international obliga-
tions.
Admittedly, even as to this consequence there is justifiable
skepticism as to whether the international community will apply a
treaty of adhesion doctrine to international agreements and to
TRIPS. International jurists, such as those on the WTO Appellate
Body, may be reluctant to embrace such an approach because it is
politically motivated and because the doctrine may be controver-
sial. The doctrine is nevertheless important as an attempt to in-
form a discussion of international treaty interpretation with ideas
drawn from the approach. Further, the doctrine may have an indi-
rect forward-looking influence as an indication of policy and prin-
ciples.
11 The General Council and the Ministerial Conference have the exclusive au-
thority to adopt interpretations of TRIPS and are not bound in their formal inter-
pretation of TRIPS Agreement by any World Trade Organization ("WTO") Panel
Reports. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; Abbott, supra note 8, at 492.
12 Throughout this article, unless specifically noted, the term "developing
countries" will refer to both developing countries and least-developed countries,
because both occupied relatively similar positions during the TRIPS negotiations.
"Developing countries," however, is a broad term, "covering economies ranging
from those largely based on subsistence agriculture to those [such as] Brazil and
India[,] which have highly industrialized sectors." Gregory Shaffer, How to
Make the IATO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some
Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in ICTSD RESOURCE PAPER No. 5
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE ISSUES 1, 22 (International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development, March 2003), available at http://
www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/resource-papers/DSU_2003.pdf [hereinafter
Shaffer Dispute Settlement]. Unlike developing countries, which self-designate
their status, the term "least developed country" refers to those countries whose
.per capita gross national product (GNP) remains less than $1,000 per year." Id.
at 23.
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
2. CONTRACTS OF ADHESION: ADHESION DEFINED
Traditional contract law is built on the premise that parties
consent to be bound by certain obligations. The paradigmatic con-
tract is one between parties of relatively equal bargaining power,
achieved through a negotiation process that reflects this power
balance.13 Of course, not all contracts fall within this paradigm. A
number of contracts involve parties with unequal bargaining
power where the weaker party has very little opportunity to nego-
tiate the terms of a contract and very little choice in accepting its
terms. Such contracts are generally referred to as contracts of ad-
hesion.14
In short, contracts of adhesion allow one party to impose terms
on another unwilling or unsuspecting party. This occurs because
the party that drafts the contract usually has had the advantage of
time and expert advice in preparing the contract, almost inevitably
producing a contract slanted in that party's favor. The drafting
party then presents the contract to the other party, who not only is
relatively unfamiliar with the terms but often does not have the
opportunity to read and comprehend those terms, either because
they are hidden in fine print or buried in complexity. Even when
the non-drafting party has the opportunity to read the contract,
that party usually lacks any meaningful choice but to accept the
contract- because of a lack of alternatives and because of the ac-
cepting party's severely disproportionate bargaining position. This
results in a contract presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis "un-
der which the only alternative to complete adherence is outright
rejection."'15
13 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs 285 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that tradi-
tional contract law was designed for this paradigmatic equal-bargaining model).
14 See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33
HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1920) (noting that life insurance industry contracts were
typically ones of adhesion) [hereinafter Patterson, Delivery].
15 FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, at 286. See also Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10
Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) ("The term [contract of adhesion] sig-
nifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of supe-
rior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to
adhere to the contract or to reject it."). A contract of adhesion or standardized
contract can benefit the parties because it: (1) "simplif[ies] operations and re-
duce[s] costs"; (2) "frees sales and office personnel from responsibility for contract
terms" because such forms are "the product of [a] skilled drafter"; (3) "facilitates
the accumulation of experience"; and (4) "helps to make risks calculable... and
increases that real security which is the necessary basis of initiative and the as-
sumption of tolerable risks." FARNSWORTH, supra note 13, at 285-86. See also Mor-
[Vol. 27:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss3/2
TRIPS AND TREATIES OF ADHESION
Describing a contract as one of adhesion-one that resulted
from unequal bargaining power -is not by itself dispositive insofar
as enforceability is concerned; rather, it is "the beginning and not
the end of the analysis." 16 Courts will enforce such contracts
unless there are other factors present, such as surprise, gross un-
fairness, undue oppression, unconscionability, or a contract or
provision that is inconsistent with the "reasonable expectations" of
the weaker party.1 7 Contract provisions that do not "fall within the
reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party will not
be enforced" against that party. Even if the contract or provision is
"consistent with the reasonable expectation of the parties, courts
will nonetheless deny enforcement if, "considered in its context," a
contract or provision is "unduly oppressive or 'unconscionable."'
18
Thus, labeling a contract as one of adhesion raises a red flag that
justifies closer scrutiny of the contract. Theories of assent also play
a role. Because real assent is a fundamental condition of contracts,
contracts that do not involve such assent-for example, those in-
volving duress, coercion, fraud, and adhesion-are unenforce-
able.1 9 Finally, a court finding that a contract is unenforceable will
then rescind the contract, excise the offending provisions, or con-
strue the contract in favor of the weaker party.
20
ris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 558 (1933) (broadly dis-
cussing the various rationales for contracting); Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpreta-
tion and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 857 (1964) ("The process
makes for simplification, clarity, and precision in contracts.") [hereinafter Patter-
son, Interpretation].
16 Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981).
17 See id. at 172 ("[A] contract of adhesion is fully enforceable according to its
terms, unless certain other factors are present which, under established legal
rules - legislative or judicial - operate to render it otherwise." (citations omitted)).
Adhesion contracts may be unenforceable on at least three different grounds: (1)
"there was not true assent to a particular term"; (2) "even if there was assent, the
term is to be excised from the contract because it contravenes public policy"; or (3)
"the term is unconscionable and should be stricken." JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 399 (5th ed. 2003).
18 See Graham, 623 P.2d at 173.
19 See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 370 (1960) (arguing that parties do not assent to boiler-plate terms, but
instead give a blanket assent to the basic nature of the transaction, a few specifi-
cally negotiated terms, and any other terms that are not unreasonable).
20 See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 172
(Iowa 1975) (noting that courts interpreting a form contract should do so in light
of the average person entering into that contract); Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quig-
ley, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (R.I. 1977) (noting that the test to determine meaning of in-
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To the theories described above, one commentator adds yet an-
other limitation -distributive fairness. Here, the particular subject
matter involved in a contractual controversy plays a key role.
Kronman describes this as follows:
Many contracts are contracts of adhesion in the general
sense that one party is able to dictate terms to the other, but
this alone does not make an agreement objectionable. Sup-
pose, for example, that my neighbor owns a painting I hap-
pen to covet. I offer him $5000 [sic] for it. He responds,
"$10,000 and no warranties regarding its authenticity. Take
it or leave it." Clearly, the fact that I lack bargaining power
and must adhere to the terms he proposes does not by itself
justify a judicial or legislative effort to tip the balance in my
favor. The imbalance in this case, which stems from the fact
that he owns the painting and I do not, is unobjectionable
because we do not care how control over the painting is dis-
tributed.
We feel differently about the distribution of control over
society's available housing stock .... The distribution of
housing matters more to us than the distribution of paint-
ings .... Those contracts of adhesion that disturb us do so,
then, because they reflect an underlying distribution of
power or resources that offends our conception of distribu-
tive fairness; when distributive concerns are weak or non-
existent, contracts of adhesion are less troubling and the
concept of adhesion itself loses meaning.21
Kronman recognizes the social controls on freedom of contract
and overreaching in contracts whenever contracts involve distribu-
tion of power over important resources.
Concern over overreaching, lack of assent, and distributive
fairness are not confined to the consumer context. While many
contracts of adhesion indeed involve consumer contracts, courts
have fittingly extended the doctrine to the commercial context as
well.22 This is appropriate, as many commercial relationships in-
surance contract terms is what the ordinary reader would have understood them
to mean).
21 Anthony Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
771-72 (1982) (citations omitted).
22 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRAcTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 413 (6th
ed. 2001):
It is not surprising.., that courts have been less willing to find uncon-
scionability in agreements where the bargaining position of the parties is
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volve situations in which the parties' bargaining positions are un-
equal, thus facilitating one party's efforts to impose its terms on
another. Accordingly, when the relationship between commercial
entities is characterized by an inequality of economic resources and
an agreement between them reflects the gross bargaining disparity,
courts have also relied on the contracts of adhesion doctrine in in-
terpreting agreements.23 This is important, as it helps bridge the
gap between applying the doctrine to consumers and applying the
doctrine to countries. 2
4
3. TRIPS IS A TREATY OF ADHESION
3.1. Treaties of Adhesion as International Law
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting the many similari-
ties between contracts and treaties. Indeed, domestic courts, inter-
national tribunals, and scholars have explicitly and repeatedly
noted this similarity. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has
stated that treaties are contracts between independent nations.
25
Similarly, the TRIPS Appellate Body has stated that treaties are
"the international equivalent of a contract." 26 Scholars have also
noted that "[h]owever styled, [treaties] are in the first place essen-
tially contracts between states." 27 Scholars and tribunals liken trea-
more likely to be equal, and where experienced traders are less likely to
be confronted with 'unfair surprise' in terms ....
Of course, not all businesses have equal clout, and in cases where that
difference is relevant to the terms of the deal struck, courts have enter-
tained claims of unconscionability.
23 See, e.g., Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373-74 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) (declining to award damages to a franchisor because the award
would be oppressive given the disparity in bargaining power between a franchi-
sor and franchisee).
24 Some commentators question whether the doctrine is necessary or success-
ful. For example, Maxeiner states that "[w]hile some observers believe that eco-
nomic self-interest largely prevents standard terms drafters from overreaching
and that a control limited to the rare 'unconscionable' term is sufficient, others
complain that the current control is awkward at best and woefully inadequate at
worst." Maxeiner, supra note 7, at 110 (citations omitted).
25 See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("The treaty-making
power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign
relations... and any conflicting law of the state must yield.").
26 Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, § F, at 15,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
27 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2d ed. 1993).
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ties to contracts for a number of reasons. Treaties, like contracts,
settle relations between parties. Both are based on the concept of
assent to be bound, as they are presumably formed through a
process of negotiation and bargaining. 28 Both are also difficult to
draft free of ambiguity.29 Both are interpreted using particular
methods and/or strategies; specifically, both are interpreted using
the "text, object and purpose" canons of interpretation.30 In addi-
tion, treaties, like contracts, may be void for public policy ration-
ales (e.g., treaties that violate jus cogens, such as agreements sanc-
tioning slavery or genocide). Finally, neither a treaty nor a contract
can bind non-parties.31
28 But cf. John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective On Treaties: A Synthesis Of In-
ternational Relations Theory And International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 163 (1996)
(challenging the consent-based approach of the law of treaties in explaining why
nations are bound to their treaty obligations and discussing the alternative "le-
gitimacy" approach). The legitimacy approach-which argues that governments
observe their treaty obligations to increase their legitimacy -flows from an exer-
cise of sovereign power in the case of treaties and freedom of contract in the case
of contracts. Whether countries still maintain sovereignty over intellectual prop-
erty matters since the move from the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") to TRIPS is debatable. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 10.
29 In fact, treaties may be more vague and ambiguous for reasons such as ex-
pediency, political motivation, lack of consensus, and the number of involved par-
ties.
3o Domestic courts rely on the textualist, intentionalist, and teleological ap-
proaches to treaty interpretation. See Appellate Body Report, India - Patent Protec-
tion for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec.
19, 1997) (describing how the domestic court of India will proceed in interpreting
facets of the TRIPS agreement); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (stating
that in the U.S. courts "treaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which
govern the interpretation of contracts in writing between individuals"). Interna-
tional tribunals also rely on the textualist, intentionalist, and teleological ap-
proaches to treaty interpretation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 31, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (describing the factors taken
into account when interpreting treaties) [hereinafter VCLT].
31 In treaty vernacular, the notion that a non-party cannot be bound is known
as the principle of ius tertii. There are, however, some exceptions to this principle.
Among the most notable are "objective regimes," which are understood as bind-
ing on non-parties. Examples include the United Nations Charter, the 1959 Ant-
arctic Treaty (and other environmental regimes), and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS
28 (2001) (giving examples of "objective regimes"). There also are critical differ-
ences between treaties and contracts and, more importantly, between the domes-
tic legal framework and the international legal framework that make simple im-
portation of contract principles problematic. Paramount among these differences
is that international law lacks a single legislature to create laws; a judicial branch
to interpret the laws and settle disputes; and an effective enforcement mechanism.
Domestic law thus cannot simply be transplanted into international fora. See
OSCAR SCHACHTER, 13 DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW
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Similarities to contracts aside, we still must consider whether it
is appropriate to apply the doctrine of adhesion to TRIPS. This in-
volves a two-step process. The first step is to analyze to what ex-
tent this doctrine is part of international law (i.e., a concept binding
on states by treaty, custom, or as a general principle). The second
step is to analyze whether the doctrine, if it is in fact a part of in-
ternational law, can be incorporated into and used to interpret
TRIPS.
3.1.1. Sources of international law
Whether the doctrine of adhesion is a legal norm that can be
applied to a treaty depends on the "sources doctrine." Specifically,
it is a question of determining what sources contain the norms of
international law that can be applied to nations. While there is
considerable debate over the sources of international law -such as
where one finds sources of international law, whether those
sources are exclusive, and what makes international law binding -
most international scholars and lawyers concur that the analysis
begins with the traditional articulation of sources in Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ Statute").
32
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 52 (1991) (stating that "caution is still required in infer-
ring international law from municipal law" because the appropriateness of mu-
nicipal law for application on the international level is limited). See also SHABTAI
ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986 128 (1989) (describing
how the analogy between treaty and contract is "simply false"); EVANGELOS
RAFTOPOULOS, THE INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRACTUAL ANALOGY IN THE LAW OF
TREATIES (1990); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Inter-
national Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 28-33 (1999) (discussing similarities and differ-
ences between contracts and treaties).
32 To be sure, there are many criticisms of finding international norms in
sources such as custom or general principles. Such criticisms revolve around the
fact that these sources leave too much wiggle room for the courts, providing no
real precision. See LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 125 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing problems that arise when laws are appli-
cations of vague maxims, such as the principle of good faith). A similar criticism
is echoed by Kelly, who argues that customary international law is not a viable
source of "legitimate norms in a world of conflicting values and interests." J. Pat-
rick Kelly, Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of
Self-Restraint, 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 353, 375-78 (2002). He argues that there is
no agreed-upon methodology to determine state practice and that customary in-
ternational law is uncertain and controversial, making it unsuitable for trumping
negotiated treaty norms, particularly in view of the many different cultures and
values of the states. Id. at 376. Kelly also argues that customary norms sometimes
conflict, are generally vague, lack democratic legitimacy, and represents "a poor
lawmaking process in a world of over 180 states with diverse values and inter-
ests." Id. at 376-77. These criticisms notwithstanding, general principles and cus-
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Article 38 recognizes four different sources: (1) international
conventions and treaties; (2) international custom; (3) general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) judicial deci-
sions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
various nations.33 By its express terms, Article 38 only applies to
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"); nonetheless, many courts
see it as authoritative and apply these sources in resolving interna-
tional disputes.34
3.1.2. Adhesion is a general principle of law recognized by civilized
nations
The contracts of adhesion doctrine is not a treaty or a custom;
however, it may fall within the category of "a general principle of
law recognized by civilized nations." 35 Concededly, general prin-
ciples are an elusive concept and a very narrow category of bind-
ing international law, traditionally limited to filling holes left by in-
tom are used by international tribunals as authoritative sources of international
law and are appropriately used here to evaluate whether TRIPS jurists can apply
the contracts of adhesion doctrine to TRIPS disputes.
33 In full, Section 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice pro-
vides:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, available at
http:/ /www.icj-cig.org/icjwww/basicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §
102(4) (1987) ("General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not
incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement, may be
invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate.").
34 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2d ed., 2003)
(listing the material sources of custom, including international judicial decisions);
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed.
1997) ("Although this formulation is technically limited to the sources of interna-
tional law which the International Court must apply ... there is no serious conten-
tion that the provision expresses the universal perception as to the enumeration of
sources of international law.").
35 ICJ Statute, art. 38(1)(c).
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ternational treaties and customary international law.36 Moreover,
the use of general principles has been more commonly and specifi-
cally used for procedural matters and less for substantive law and
doctrine.37 This does not, however, foreclose the use of general
principles in the context of the adhesion doctrine.
International tribunals and legal scholars have sharply dis-
agreed over what general principles are and how to identify
them.38 The concept of general principles as a source of interna-
tional law is based on at least three underlying concepts. First,
rules accepted in the domestic law of civilized nations is evidence
of state consensus concerning particular rules. Second, general
principles are binding because they reflect a consent to be bound.
39
Finally, reliance on general principles recognizes that international
law consistently borrows from domestic legal systems.
40
As suggested by Article 38(1)(c), a legal rule becomes a general
principle by being recognized in many of the world's legal sys-
tems. The principle need not be universally accepted to be bind-
ing. As long as a majority of states or a majority of the states af-
fected by a particular principle are practicing it, general principles
can become binding.
41
This section begins with a brief review of how contracts of ad-
hesion are treated under a number of different legal systems. Usu-
ally, a general principles analysis must consider a good number of
legal systems to determine whether general principles exist. Here,
we will consider the legal systems used by some of the major play-
ers during TRIPS negotiations: the United States and the European
36 See SCHACHTER, supra note 31, at 52 ("The international cases show.., use
in a limited degree, nearly always as a supplement to fill in gaps left by the pri-
mary sources of treaty and custom.").
37 Id. at 50.
38 See BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 16 (describing the views of different schol-
ars on defining general principles).
39 Scholars describe general principles as based on implied consent. See, e.g.,
DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRuCTURES 34-35 (1987) (stating that un-
der the positivist view, custom would only bind those who participated in its
formulation and where the repeated practice of states was "coupled with a psy-
chological intent to be bound").
40 See BEDERMAN, supra note 31, at 13 ("[Tlhe international legal system re-
mains primitive and unformed, and... often recourse must be had to 'borrowing'
legal rules from domestic law.").
41 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth., F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969
I.C.J. 12, 228-29 (Feb. 20) (Lachs, J. dissenting) (stating that a principle of interna-
tional law may become binding even without universal acceptance so long as a
large number or a majority of states practice the principle).
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Union (the "EU") (the two dominant powers during TRIPS nego-
tiations); Germany and the United Kingdom (the "U.K.") (two of
the most economically and technologically advanced individual
members of the EU); Canada; Japan; Korea; and China. Together,
these nations represent common and civil law systems, and coun-
tries with vastly different economies and cultures (e.g., commu-
nism and capitalism). Because a law found in all domestic systems
does not ipso facto mean it is international law, the section con-
cludes by arguing why the doctrine of adhesion is worthy of this
status.
3.1.2.1. The United States
Most legal systems responded to adhesion contracts in the late
nineteenth century, when standard form contracts proliferated. 42
This was to counteract the rise of monopolies and conglomerates,
which used their superior bargaining position to impose one-sided
contracts with onerous terms.43
As previously noted, the contract of adhesion doctrine exists in
the United States and has been applied for almost a century. The
concept did not originate in the United States but was integrated
into the legal system in 1919. French philosopher and jurist Ray-
mond Saleilles coined the phrase at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury while describing contracts reflecting the will of one party:
Eventually the law must, indeed, yield to the shading and
differences that have emerged from social relations. There
42 Angelo and Ellinger note that during the eighteenth century and first half
of the nineteenth century, the law of supply and demand that governed the man-
ner in which small traders and artisans competed for customers precluded use of
standard form contracts that had one-sided terms. A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger,
Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Approaches in England, France,
Germany, and the United States, 14 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 455, 457 (1992).
They observe, however, that by the end of the nineteenth century
[tjhe emergence of large monopolistic companies, such as the early rail-
ways, completely changed the balance of power in negotiations. These
companies had the power to offer their services on whatever terms they
pleased. Any equality of bargaining power between such giants and the
average citizen was, and has remained, illusory.
Id. The authors note that in the mid-twentieth century, the rise of multina-
tional corporations and their subsidiaries aggravated the situation.
43 See id. at 458 (discussing contract terms that greatly favor the stronger
party as unconscionable); Maxeiner, supra note 7, at 114 ("Recognition that con-
tract law should provide some measure of protection against overreaching in con-
tract terms is near universal in modern legal systems.").
696 [Vol. 27:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss3/2
TRIPS AND TREATIES OF ADHESION
are pretended contracts that have only the name, the juridi-
cal construction of which remains yet to be made. For
these, in any event, the rules of individual interpretation
should undergo important modifications, if only that one
might call them, for lack of a better term, contracts of adhe-
sion, those in which a single will is exclusively predomi-
nant, acting as a unilateral will which dictates its law, no
longer to an individual, but to an indeterminate collectivity,
and which in advance undertakes unilaterally, subject to
the adhesion of those who would wish to accept the law...
of the contract and to take advantage of the engagements
imposed on themselves.44
U.S. scholar Edwin W. Patterson suggested that a term recog-
nizing differences in social relations "seem[ed] worthy of a place in
our legal vocabulary." 45 Thus the doctrine was born in the United
States. The EU's effort to address contracts of adhesion is more re-
cent.
3.1.2.2. The European Union: the European Community's
Unfair Terms Directive
In 1993, the EU issued Council Directive 93/13/EEC, known as
the Unfair Terms Directive ("Directive").46 The Directive is con-
sumer protection legislation and the first European-wide effort to
address standard term contracts. Standard term contracts include
terms that "one party formulates for use in its contract generally
and provides to other parties for use in their mutual transac-
tions."47 The terms are not negotiated but are presented at the con-
44 Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 15, at 856 (quoting SALEILLES, DE LA DEC-
LARATION DE VOLONTE, § 89, at 229-30 (1901) (Edwin W. Patterson, trans.)). Patter-
son surmises that "[t]he term 'adhesion contract' may have been derived from the
analogy of multilateral treaties, which are drawn up by negotiations between a
few nations who sign and invite other nations to adhere to the treaty later." Id. at
375 n.96.
45 Patterson, Delivery, supra note 14, at 222 n.106. See 2 M. PLANiOL, TRAITE
ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL § 972 (1950) (indicating that terms recognizing differ-
ences in social relations abound in French Law); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
§§ 532-33 (1996) (recognizing disparity in the social relations underlying legisla-
tion in different nations).
46 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Unfair
Terms Directive]. Directives, which are addressed to member states, are "binding
with respect to the results to be achieved," even though members may choose the
form of implementation. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 256 (2002).
47 Maxeiner, supra note 7, at 110.
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clusion of contract bargaining.48 The Directive applies to all con-
tracts and terms that have not been individually negotiated and
requires that member states adopt statutes and standards that pro-
tect consumers from overreaching in contracts by requiring certain
minimum standards. 49
As in the United States, the Directive seeks to address abusive
practices, one-sided contracts, and unfair terms.50 In addition, the
Directive pays particular attention to good faith and the relative
strength of the parties' bargaining positions.5 1 Accompanying the
Directive is an explanatory memorandum that sheds light on some
of its concerns:
Suppliers generally have the advantage in drafting stan-
dard contract forms. Individual consumers rarely negotiate
those terms and, if they do, they seldom have bargaining
power sufficient to protect their interests. The principle of
freedom of contract permits suppliers through use of stan-
dard terms to impose on consumer terms that 'satisfy the
suppliers' interest but disregard the interests of the con-
sumers.' 52
The Directive's more important articles include Articles 3, 5,
and 6. Consistent with the good faith principles noted above, Arti-
cle 3 provides: "[a] contractual term which has not been individu-
ally negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the re-
quirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the
parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the
detriment of the consumer."53
48 Id.
49 See Unfair Terms Directive pmbl., supra note 46, at 2. The minimum stan-
dards required by the Unfair Terms Directive ("the Directive") are considered
more restrictive than U.S. law. Maxeiner, supra note 7, at 111.
50 See, e.g., The Unfair Terms Directive pmbl., supra note 46, at 1.
51 In determining whether terms are unfair, "particular regard shall be had to
the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had
an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods or services were sold
or supplied to the special order of the consumer .. " Id. at 2.
52 Maxeiner, supra note 7, at 132.
53 Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 46, art. 3(1). Article 3(2) further pro-
vides that "[a] term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where
it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to
influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated
standard contract." Id. art. 3(2).
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Article 5 provides for a contra proferentem rule of contract inter-
pretation: "[i]n the case of contracts where all or certain terms of-
fered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be
drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about
the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the
consumer shall prevail."
5 4
Article 6 establishes the non-binding nature of unfair terms:
[miember [sitates shall lay down that unfair terms used in a
contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier
shall, as provided for under their national law, not be bind-
ing on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to
bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continu-
ing in existence without the unfair terms.
55
While the Directive is instructive, it is nonetheless an edict that
individual members must implement in their respective legisla-
tures. All EU members, including Germany and the U.K., have
done so.
56
3.1.2.3. Germany
3.1.2.3.1. Germany's Standard Terms Statute of 1976
While the Directive is limited to the consumer context, it is
merely a minimum directive; members are free to provide more
protection if they choose to do so. Germany's law provides more
protection than the Directive requires. Germany's law on adhesion
contracts deserves special mention, as the German Standard Terms
Statute of 1976 (the "German Statute") was the "source of inspira-
54 Id. art. 5.
55 Id. art. 6(1). The Directive also attempts to guard against forum shopping
in individual countries. Article 6(2) states that "Member States shall take the nec-
essary measures to ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection granted
by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-Member country as the
law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close connection with the territory
of the Member States." Id. art. 6(2).
56 Because of the Directive, the individual European Union ("EU") members
have similar statutes. Germany and the United Kingdom ("U.K.") are used as ex-
amples because they are two of the larger members (in terms of population and
economy) and have contrasting legal systems (German is a civil law system and
the U.K. is a common law system).
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tion" for the Unfair Terms Directive.57
Germany's treatment of standard form contracts comes from
both judge-made law and legislation. At the end of the nineteenth
century, German judges issued numerous consumer protection
opinions to combat, in large part, the widespread use of standard
form agreements. The German Statute has a statutory basis in the
German Civil Code of 1900. In particular, Section 138 provided
that "a transaction that offends good morals (gute Sitten) is void";
Section 242 provided that "[o]bligations shall be performed in the
manner required by good faith [Treu and Glauben]."5 8 The German
Supreme Court used these two provisions to limit enforcement of
standard terms.59 The Supreme Court's decisions during the 1950s
and 1960s, along with an emerging consumer movement, "set in
motion broader changes in thinking that culminated in the Stan-
dard Terms Statute."60
As already noted, standard terms problems arise because
dominant parties use their advantage to draft contracts that resolve
all issues in their favor, giving the weaker party no opportunity to
negotiate certain issues or seek alternative options. The German
Statute recognizes that, in these situations, there is little or no free-
dom of contract. The statute sets limits on the ability of stronger
parties to exploit their superior bargaining position to take "inap-
propriate advantage" of other parties.61
The German Statute is comprised of two principal parts. The
first part reveals the procedural requirements that should deter-
mine what terms would become part of a particular contract. It re-
quires that the party presenting an adhesion contract give the other
party notice and an opportunity to review the standard terms con-
tract.
62
The second part relates to whether and how the substance of
the terms should be subject to control.63 This part is predicated on
57 Maxeiner, supra note 7, at 111-12. Germany also has the largest population
of any country in the EU. Therefore, its treatment and implementation of the Di-
rective is most revealing from an economic standpoint.
58 Id. at 142.
59 Id. at 143.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 148.
62 See id. at 151 (defining standard terms as "terms prepared beforehand for a
multiple number of contracts and.., presented.., by the user to the other party
at the contract's conclusion").
63 Maxeiner, supra note 7, at 152. Maxeiner refers to the first part (regarding
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the absence of agreement between the parties as to the content of
the contract terms.64 German courts use a three-pronged approach
to evaluate whether terms in an adhesion contract will govern.
First, courts will look to see whether an allegedly offending term is
on a "black list" of prohibited terms. Second, courts determine
whether the term is on a "grey list" of suspect terms. Finally, the
court will test the term against the good faith standard found in a
general good faith clause.65 The good faith clause looks to see
whether the contract term is entirely one-sided and fails to take
into account the other party's interests. 66 The sum effect of these
provisions is that obligations imposed by adhesion contracts must
be "reasonable in relation both to the user's own interests and the
burden imposed on the other party." 6
7
As for contract interpretation, the German statute provides that
any doubts in construing standard terms are to be resolved against
the user (kundengunstigste Auslegung).68
3.1.2.3.2. Germany's implementation of the EU's Unfair
Terms Directive
When Germany harmonized the German Statute with the EU's
Unfair Terms Directive, only "relatively minor changes" were re-
quired. 69 However, the German Statute diverges from the Direc-
tive in a number of key respects. First, the German Statute is not
limited to the consumer context; it is a general statute that governs
standard terms and protects all parties from the misuse of standard
terms. 70 Second, because the law governs a particular contract
formal or procedural requirements) as "incorporation control" and the second
part (regarding substance) as "content control." Id. at 114-15.
64 See id. at 161.
65 See HANS-W. MICKLITZ, RAPPORT SUR L'APPLICATION PRACTIQUE
DE LA DIRECTVE 93/13/EEC DANS LA REPUBLIQUE FDtRALE D'ALLEMAGNE
[Report on the Practical Application of Directive 93/13/EEC in
the Federal Republic of Germany] at 238, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
healthconsumer/events/event29_03.pdf (noting the procedure used to deter-
mine the validity of terms in adhesion contracts); see also Maxeiner, supra note 7, at
152-54 (detailing the court's standards and procedures).
66 See Maxeiner, supra note 7, at 154 (discussing the standard for violations of
good faith).
67 Id. Maxeiner notes that courts rely on principles of necessity and propor-
tionality in deciding which terms of the contract to uphold.
68 Id. at 152.
69 Id. at 162.
70 Id. at 149.
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
practice generally, it does not require a finding that the exploited
party is weak.
71
Two other provisions in the German Civil Code of 1900 also
merit consideration, as they contain general provisions that relate
to adhesion contracts. Section 138(1) provides: "a legal transaction
which offends good morals is void."72 Section 138(2) also voids a
legal transaction when
somebody, by exploiting the predicament, inexperience,
lack of judgment[,] or considerable weakness of will or the
other party, causes pecuniary advantages to be promised or
conferred onto him or onto a third party in exchange for
performance, whereby these pecuniary advantages are
clearly disproportionate to this performance. 73
Courts have used these two general provisions in cases where a
party controls the economic freedom of another party such that the
party applies a "stranglehold" over that party.74
3.1.2.4. The United Kingdom
3.1.2.4.1. The United Kingdom's 1977 Unfair Contract Terms
Act
Similar to Germany law, U.K. law protecting consumers from
unconscionable and adhesion contracts is a mixture of common
and statutory law. Protection from such contracts dates back to the
seventeenth century, when, in limited circumstances, courts
granted equitable relief from harsh and unconscionable bargains.75
Very early cases granted remedies against oppressive bargains de-
signed to protect the estates of the landed classes (e.g., transactions
involving trading on the weakness of expectant heirs).76 Up
through the nineteenth century, the principle supporting these de-
cisions was the need to remedy inequalities of bargaining power.
Angelo and Ellinger summarize U.K. law concerning unconscion-
71 Id.
72 Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil
I [BGBl. I] 1, § 138(1), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla.
73 Id. § 138(2).
74 See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 42, at 489 (providing history of court
cases dealing with unconscionability rules).
75 Id. at 460-65.
76 Id. at 460-61.
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able and adhesion contracts during this period as follows:
[T]he English law gives relief to one who, without inde-
pendent advice, enters into a contract upon terms which are
very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which
is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is griev-
ously impaired by reason of his own needs'or desires, or by
his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influ-
ences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the
benefit of the other.77
Common law also developed rules of construction to combat
the inequality of bargaining power; chief among these the contra
proferentem rule.78
As for statutory protection, the English legislature enacted the
Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 (the "U.K. Act" or "Act"). The
U.K. Act's purpose is to protect consumers from clauses that either
eliminate or restrict liability for negligence or non-performance of a
contract by one party.79 It applies primarily to exemption clauses
in standard form contracts and provides guidelines for determin-
ing the reasonableness of a specific contractual clause. Factors that
a court considers in determining reasonableness include:
the relative strength of the parties' bargaining positions;
whether the customer received an inducement to agree to
the term or had an opportunity to enter into a similar con-
tract without the offending clause with another person; and
whether the customer knew or should have known of the
existence of the exemption clause.80
The Act makes the offending clause void.81
77 Id. at 467.
78 See ROBERT BRADGATE, IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 93/13 INTO THE
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS: EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, http://
ec.europa.eu/dgs/healthsconsumer/events/event29_01.pdf, 26-27 [hereinafter
Bradgate U.K. Report] (describing the purposes of construction rules when deal-
ing with terms of adhesion contracts).
79 See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 42, at 470-71 (clarifying the primary func-
tion of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 (the "U.K. Act" or "Act") in light of
its potentially misleading title).
80 Id. at 471.
81 See id. at 470-71 (discussing the outcome of application of the U.K. Act).
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3.1.2.4.2. The United Kingdom's Implementation of the EU's
Unfair Terms Directive
In 1994, the United Kingdom implemented the Directive by en-
acting the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (the
"U.K. Regulations" or the "Regulations"). In contrast to Germany,
the United Kingdom implemented the Directive not by amending
existing legislation but by making secondary legislation -simply
transposing the Directive's text almost verbatim into the Regula-
tions.82 This left preexisting legislation in place,8 3 resulting in sig-
nificant overlap between the Act and the Regulations.8 4
Because the Act only prohibited businesses from excluding or
limiting liability for breach of contract or negligence, the Regula-
tions expanded legal protections by scrutinizing all contracts and
contract terms drafted in advance and over which the consumer
had little influence. Just like the Act, however, the Regulations in-
cluded a test of fairness based on both a substantive and proce-
dural definition of unfairness. Substantive unfairness exists when
a term creates a "significant imbalance" in the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties to the detriment of the consumer.85 Procedural
unfairness exists when the imbalance is "contrary to the require-
ment of good faith."8 6 The Regulations also reflect U.K. rules of
construction. In particular, the Regulations implement the Direc-
tive's requirement that contract terms be expressed in "plain, intel-
ligible language" and provide that "if there is doubt about the
meaning of a written term, the interpretation most favourable to
the consumer shall prevail" - in other words, the contra proferentem
rule itself.87
The Regulations made three significant changes to preexisting
U.K. law. First, the Regulations introduced the concept of good
faith. Prior to the Regulations, English law did not recognize a
82 See Bradgate U.K. Report, supra note 78, at 30 (describing the government's
procedure for implementing the Unfair Terms Directive).
83 See id. at 29 (illustrating the history of adhesion contracts legislation).
84 See id. (observing that "in some cases the Act gives greater protection than
the Regulations whilst in others the Regulations give greater protection").
85 See id. at 32 (detailing similarities between the Regulations and prior law
on unfair terms).
86 Id. at 31. This is similar to the English law's test of reasonableness in
weighing whether a contract term was unfair or whether the term "was a fair and
reasonable one to include in the particular contract between the parties." Id. at 28.
87 Id. at 33.
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general duty of good faith outside of specific doctrines.88 Because
good faith was alien to U.K. lawyers, the Regulations included a
list of factors to guide lawyers. These include a consideration of
the parties' relative strength and bargaining position, whether al-
ternate options existed, and whether compliance was practicable.
89
The second change was the requirement that terms be ex-
pressed in plain, intelligible language. According to English
scholar Robert Bradgate, this requirement was also unfamiliar to
many English lawyers, who were "trained for decades in the tradi-
tion of Victorian conveyances to couch even the simplest agree-
ments in complex 'legalese."' 90 This requirement resulted in the
use of fewer standard terms.91
The final change was authorizing the U.K. Director General of
Fair Trading to bring actions against businesses that use contracts
with unfair terms.92 This is consistent with the Directive's condi-
tion that "adequate and effective means exist to prevent the con-
tinued use of unfair terms." 93 The Director General has used this
power extensively.94
3.1.2.5. Korea
Korea's Adhesion Contract Act of 1986 (the "Korea Act") is de-
signed to protect consumers by preventing businesses from using
their superior negotiating position to prepare and use adhesion
contracts that contain unfair terms. 95 The Korea Act defines adhe-
88 See id. at 34 (describing the place of good faith in the Directive and Regula-
tions); see also Brian St. J. Collins, Report on the Practical Implementation of Directive
93/13/EEC in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, in MINUTES FOR
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE: THE UNFAIR TERMS DIRECrIvE, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health-consumer/events/event29_O3.pdf at 317, 328
[hereinafter Collins U.K. Report].
89 See The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1994, S.I.
1194/3159, sched. 2 (U.K.).
90 Bradgate U.K. Report, supra note 78, at 35.
91 See id. at 36 (discussing commentators' negative opinions of the use of
plain language in contracts).
92 See, e.g., Collins U.K. Report, supra note 88, at 323 (stating that the method
of enforcement is the most important change resulting from the U.K.'s adoption of
the Directive.).
93 Unfair Terms Directive art. 7, supra note 46, at 7.
94 See Collins U.K. Report, supra note 88, at 326 (noting that the Director Gen-
eral has issued a number of publications discussing the effects of the Unfair Terms
Regulations).
95 See Korea Adhesion Contract Act art. 1, (1986), available at ftc.go.kr/
data/hwp/adhesion(6459).doc.
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sion contracts as "the general terms and conditions of a contract,
regardless of their name, type, or scope, prepared in advance by
one party in a certain form for the purposes of entering into a con-
tract with a large number of persons." 96 The Korea Act obligates
businesses to explain the content of the adhesion contracts they use
"in a way that would generally be expected" and outline the "im-
portant particulars" so that customers can understand them.97 It
also provides that if a business violates the its provisions, it cannot
claim that the pertinent adhesion contract terms become null and
void. Finally, the Korea Act construes adhesion contracts "impar-
tially in accordance with the principle of trust and good faith" and
provides that if the meaning of an adhesion contract is unclear it
"shall be construed in favor of the [c]ustomer."98
3.1.2.6. China and Japan
China and Japan have similar laws protecting consumers from
businesses that overreach through use of their superior bargaining
positions. China's Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and
Interests99 (the "China Law") is designed to protect consumers by
requiring that business dealers "adhere to the principles of volun-
tary [sic], equality, fair deal [sic], honesty, and credibility" when
they enter into contracts with consumers. 100 The China Law pre-
vents businesses from using form contracts that are unfair or un-
reasonable to consumers. 10'
Japan's Consumer Contract Act of 2001 (the "Japan Act") rec-
ognizes that consumers are at a disadvantage to businesses be-
cause businesses possess superior negotiating positions and access
to information. In its December 1999 Report, Japan's Social Policy
Council recommended that the Diet enact the Japan Act to level the
96 Id. art. 2.
97 Id. art. 3.
98 Id. art. 5. The Act defines customer as "a person who is a party to a con-
tract and has received from an [e]nterprise an offer to incorporate an adhesion
contract into the contract." Id. art. 2.
99 Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of Consumer Rights
and Interests (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., 1993)
(P.R.C.), available at http://gsyj.saic.gov.cn/wcm/WCMData/pub/saic/english/
Laws% 20and% 20Regulations/t20060227_14639.htm.
100 Id. art. 4.
101 Id. art. 24.
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playing field. The Japan Act was passed in 2000 and put into force
in 2001.102
In many ways similar to the law in other nations, the Japan Act
protects consumers by permitting them to avoid the obligations of
contracts in view of "the gap in quality and quantity of information
and in the negotiating power between consumers and business,"
all of which "unfairly impair the interests of consumers." 10 3 Under
the Japan Act, "[c]ertain types of contract terms which are unrea-
sonably disadvantageous to a consumer shall be deemed null and
void."'104
3.1.2.7. Canada
Canada's treatment of adhesion contracts is rooted in case law.
In Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin,10 5 the court commented that
adhesion contracts are documents drawn on standard forms, each
involving a weaker party with little or no part in the negotiation
and having no choice but to comply with its terms.10 6 Under these
circumstances, Canadian courts hold that "it is eminently fair that
if there is any ambiguity in the terms used in the [contract], the
words of the documents should be construed against the party
which drew it, by applying the contra proferentem rule."10 7 This rul-
ing is not limited to the consumer context.108
102 The Consumer Contract Act of Japan (2001), http://unpanl.un.org/intra-
doc/ groups/public/documents/ APCITY/UNPAN023503.pdf#search= %22% 22C
onsumer%20Contract%20Act%22%20Japan%22 [hereinafter the Japan Act] (pro-
viding an English translation of the Consumer Contract Act of Japan).
103 Id. art. 1.
104 Tsuneo Matsumoto, Privatization of Consumer Law: Current Developments
and Features of Consumer Law in Japan at the Turn of the Century, 30 HITOTSUBASHI
J.L. & POL. 1, 10 (2002). In addition to this, a consumer has the right to rescind a
contract if the business party has misrepresented or intentionally withheld impor-
tant facts, or if the consumer entered into the contract under duress. Id.
105 Manulife Bank of Can. v. Conlin, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 415 (Can.).
106 Id. at 424.
107 Id. at 425. The court notes that the contra proferentum rule calls for strict
interpretation of contract terms so that the meaning least favorable to the author
of the contract is applied. See also G.H.L FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN
CANADA 471 (3d ed. 1994); KEVIN PATRICK McGuINEss, THE LAW OF GUARANTEE: A
TREATISE ON GUARANTEE, INDEMNITY AND THE STANDBY LETTER OF CREDIT 244 (2d ed.
1996).
108 See, e.g., ECU-Line N.V. v. Z.I. Pompey Industrie, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 450 (Can.)
(noting contract construed against the more powerful party in the commercial
context). This review of domestic adhesion law in various countries can be read
more narrowly to detect differences. For example, U.S. law is directed at contracts
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This brief review of the domestic law in various countries
demonstrates that by the implied consent of the nations consid-
ered, there is sufficient consensus to make the contracts of adhe-
sion doctrine an established rule of international law. States have
uniformly applied this equitable principle since the beginning of
the twentieth century. As such, it is a doctrine that can be applied
to the international legal system and its treaties. 09
As mentioned, it is far from axiomatic that a law becomes in-
ternational law by virtue of its existence in all domestic systems. A
law must first be suitable for application on the international level
before it is properly applied there.1 0 In other words, the law must
be in an area that has "become the concern of international law.""'
There are at least three reasons that justify applying the doctrine of
adhesion on the international level: (1) the doctrine is consistent
with international law; (2) the doctrine is similar to other general
principles already recognized by the international community as
international law; and (3) the doctrine is central to domestic legal
systems worldwide.
International law recognizes and provides a remedy for over-
reaching and abusive treaties. Indeed, the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"), which is undeniably customary in-
ternational law and was adopted by numerous states at an interna-
tional conference in 1969, invalidates treaties based on coercion
and lack of consent." 2 In particular, VCLT Articles 51 and 52 are
that are unconscionable and is not limited to the consumer context. The law in
Canada, Japan, Korea, and China is also directed to contracts that exhibit unfair-
ness. The European Directive is a consumer protection directive geared towards
unfair terms in contracts. German law is consistent with this focus as well. Nev-
ertheless, all of these laws target contracts that are by themselves unfair or contain
unfair terms. Viewed in this manner, contracts with unfair terms are simply a
subset of the larger set of adhesion contracts.
109 See Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International
Law, 7 ST. THOM. L. REV. 567 (1994) (applying the doctrine to American Indian trea-
ties); see also RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE
COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS, 7-16 (1968) (explaining the process by which
domestic law becomes international law); Michael Bothe & Georg Ress, The Com-
parative Method and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 49 (William E. Butler ed., 1980) (describing the relationship between
domestic and international law).
110 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 32, at 120 (describing circumstances in which
domestic law can become international law).
111 Id. at 121.
112 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 46, at 39 (noting that as of June 2002, ninety-
four states are parties to the VCLT, which codifies or creates international law).
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on point. Art. 51 provides: "[t]he expression of a [s]tate's consent
to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of
its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall
be without any legal effect." 113 Article 52 provides: "[a] treaty is
void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of
force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations."
114
As these articles make clear, international law has before now
invalidated treaties based on coercion or lack of state consent. In
fact, a host of rules in the VCLT and other treaties is designed to
ensure the validity of state consent." 5 It is important to note, how-
ever, that the coercion recognized here relates to physical coercion.
Moreover, when these articles were adopted, many developing
countries sought an article that would invalidate "unequal trea-
ties" or sought a definition of coercion or force that included "eco-
nomic and political pressure",116 This triggered "vociferous[] sup-
port[] and vehement[] attack[s]."" 7  In the end, developed
countries-which viewed the proposal as sufficiently vague so as
to jeopardize the stability of treaty relations"18 -and developing
countries-which relied in part on the principle of the sovereign
equality of states to support a broad coercion definition 19 -
reached a unanimous compromise solution. The solution was the
Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political, or Economic
Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, which condemned the
threat or use of pressure in any form to coerce another state to con-
clude a treaty.120
The inability of developing countries to adopt an article invali-
dating unequal treaties before 1969 and the lack of express author-
ity for this in the VCLT might lead some to question whether it is
now appropriate to adopt one. There are a number of responses to
The United States is not a party to the treaty, but as the authors note, "the execu-
tive branch has described the Convention as 'the authoritative guide to current
treaty law and practice."'
113 VCLT, supra note 30, art. 51.
114 Id. art. 52.
115 Id. arts. 48-51.
116 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 46, at 45-47.
117 Id. at 47.
118 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 31, at 47.
119 Id.
120 Id.
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this. For one, just because international law only invalidates a
treaty on the grounds of physical coercion does not mean that in-
ternational law does not acknowledge an adhesion doctrine when
one exists or delimits the categories of impermissible coercion.
While domestic law invalidates contracts procured though physi-
cal force, intimidation, and duress, it also allows affected parties to
seek redress for adhesion contracts which were created under on-
erous conditions other than physical coercion. A similar alterna-
tive path exists in international law. The international community
may already recognize that there are insidious forms of coercion
that are no different than physical coercion, such as economic and
political coercion. The recent adoption of rules in various states
regarding adhesion contracts may be evidence of a trend to rethink
or broaden the concept of coercion. Moreover, cries of vagueness
from developed countries may be quieted by the more concrete
standards these countries now deploy to combat adhesion con-
tracts. Finally, while earlier arguments centered around invalidat-
ing unequal treaties, the concept advanced here not only seeks to
keep treaties intact but also relies on more than mere inequality of
states. The treaty of adhesion doctrine recognizes that equality of
states is merely juridical and that, as a practical matter, states are
unequal in many respects -including resources, economic
strength, size, political clout, and military capacity, all of which
necessarily place some states in stronger bargaining positions than
others. This difference alone cannot justify invalidating treaties.
Rather than invalidating or terminating treaties or allowing coun-
tries to withdraw from them, the doctrine seeks to interpret am-
biguous provisions in favor of developing countries.
The adhesion doctrine may also be considered a general prin-
ciple of law applicable to international relations because it is con-
sistent with other general principles of international law. For ex-
ample, general principles include such equitable principles as res
judicata, unjust enrichment, unclean hands,121 estoppel,122 and ac-
121 See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 32, at 124 ("Substantive principles applied
as 'general' principles by such tribunals have included clean hands, acquiescence,
estoppel, elementary principles of humanity, duty to make reparations, equity,
equality, protection of legitimate expectations, and proportionality.").
122 As stated by Aust:
A unilateral declaration may, depending on the intention of the state
making it and the circumstances, be binding in international law. Under-
lying this is the fundamental international law principle of good faith.
Good faith also underpins the doctrine of estoppel (preclusion), which in
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quiescence. 23 Notably, these general principles include equitable
substantive and procedural concepts. Friedmann notes that equity
as a principle of interpretation "is beyond doubt an essential and
all-pervading principle of interpretation" for both common and
civil law systems.124 The International Court of Justice (the "ICJ")
has also made clear that equitable principles are not secondary
principles of law that operate parallel to international law but are
rather part of international law.125 International law scholars like
international law is a substantive rule and broader and less technical
than estoppel in the common law, being founded on the principle that
good faith must prevail in international relations. The exact scope of the
international law doctrine is far from settled, but in general it may be
said that where a clear statement or representations made by one state to
another, which then in good faith relies upon it to its detriment, the first
state is estopped (precluded) from going back on its statement or repre-
sentation.
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 46 (2000). See also OPPEN-
HEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 527 (Jennings and Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (discussing
the principle of extinct prescription); Hugh Thirlway, The Law of Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, 1989 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 36 (1990) (analyzing es-
toppel); Siegfried Wiessner, Tribal Sovereignty: Back to the Future? American Indian
Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567 (1995) (discussing
the doctrine of contract of adhesion in connection with American Indian treaties).
Wiessner states that estoppel underlies the World Court's decisions in Legal
Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, (May 11) and Nuclear
Tests Case (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 252 (Dec. 20). See also BIN CHENG,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
145-47 (1987) (discussing the application of estoppel in the Greenland case).
123 See FRANCK, supra note 1, at 48-54 (discussing the historic origins of eq-
uity).
124 As Friedmann states:
[T]he function of equity as a principle of interpretation... is beyond
doubt an essential and all-pervading principle of interpretation in all
modern civil codifications, and it is equally important in the modern
common law systems, under a variety of terminologies such as 'reason-
able,' 'fair' or occasionally even in the guise of 'natural justice.' There is
thus overwhelming justification for the view developed by Lauterpacht,
Manley Hudson, De Visscher, and Dahm, that equity is part and parcel
of any modern system of administration of justice.
Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, in DAMROSCH ET AL., supra
note 31, at 127-28.
125 As Franck notes:
[T]he justice of which equity is an emanation is not abstract justice but
justice according to the rule of law: which is to say that its application
should display consistency and a degree of predictability; even though it
looks with particularity to the more peculiar circumstances in an instant
case, it also looks beyond it to principles of more general application.
This is precisely why courts have, from the beginning, elaborated equita-
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Damrosch note that certain general principles embrace the concept
of equity, such as principles of "fairness, reciprocity, and consid-
eration of the particular circumstances of a case." 126 Two of the
most important international law concepts are pacta sunt servanda
(i.e., treaties must be complied with) and good faith.127 These have
been described as the "fundamental principle[s] of the law of trea-
ties." 128 These examples are important because principles of good
faith and equity are precisely the principles that underlie the doc-
trine of adhesion.
A law intrinsic to the idea of law and basic to all legal systems
is appropriately considered a general principle applicable as inter-
national law.129 The notion of protecting weaker parties from the
overreaching abuse of stronger parties is intrinsic to the idea of law
and underlies the concept of contracts of adhesion. Even in the
world's contemporary capitalistic system, there are limits on coer-
cive and consensual hegemony.
3.2. Incorporating Treaties of Adhesion into the WATO
After concluding that the doctrine is part of international law,
the second part of the analysis concerns whether the doctrine can
be incorporated into or used to interpret TRIPS specifically. This
second inquiry is necessary because scholars disagree on whether
World Trade Organization ("WTO") agreements are subject to
ble principles as being, at the same time, means to an equitable result in a
particular case, yet also having a more general validity and hence ex-
pressible in general terms.
FRANCK, supra note 1, at 49. Equity, as a part of law, must be distinguished from
the concept of ex aequo et bono (i.e., outside the framework of the law). Id. at 48-54.
126 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 32, at 123.
127 Article 26 of VCLT states that "[elvery treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." VCLT, supra note 30,
art. 26. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 46, at 54 (discussing the argument that the
doctrine of good faith is implied in treaties). Pacta sunt servanda is typically trans-
lated from Latin as "treaties are to be obeyed." Good faith is further found in the
VCLT rules on treaty interpretation. Article 31 states that "[a] treaty shall be in-
terpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
VCLT, supra note 30, art. 31. See also Josef L. Kunz, The Meaning and Range of the
Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 180, 197 (1945) (exploring the meaning
of the norm pacta sunt servanda); Hans Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 775, 786 (1959) (detailing the history of pacta sunt servanda).
128 See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 31, at 54.
129 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 32, at 49 (discussing the concept of state sov-
ereignty).
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general principles, customary international law, or other mandates
outside specific WTO rules. This is an area of much contention and
critical importance.
Without question, one of the more difficult topics in interna-
tional law is that of treaty interpretation. Not only is there wide-
spread disagreement on how to interpret a treaty (e.g., what
sources a jurist may look to while interpreting) but also wide dis-
agreement on the aim and goal of treaty interpretation.
130 TRIPS
interpretation is not immune from such disagreements. In fact,
WTO agreement interpretation adds yet another wrinkle to this
problem -namely, whether non-WTO international law is relevant
in resolving WTO disputes and, more importantly for our pur-
poses, in interpreting TRIPS.
Stated somewhat differently, the question is whether WTO law
is self-contained or whether it is simply part of the broader corpus
of international law. The distinction makes a difference. If non-
WTO law is relevant, WTO jurists can rely on and apply other gen-
eral public international law, such as contracts of adhesion doc-
trine, in interpreting WTO agreements. 13' If not, WTO jurists are
limited to specific WTO agreements.
3.2.1. IATO treaty interpretation - the debate
3.2.1.1. Arguments for limiting IATO Law
The lively debate in the international community as to whether
130 For example, in treaty interpretation there are at least three generally ac-
cepted approaches: the subjective (intention of parties), objective (textual mean-
ing) and teleological (object and purpose):
On the one hand, there are those who assert that the primary, and indeed
only, aim and goal of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the intention of
the parties. There are others who start from the proposition that there
must exist a presumption that the intentions of the parties are reflected in
the text of the treaty which they have drawn up, and that the primary
goal of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of this text. Fi-
nally, there are those who maintain that the decision-maker must first as-
certain the object and purpose of a treaty and then interpret it so as to
give effect to that object and purpose.
IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d ed., Manches-
ter University Press 1984), at 114-15.
131 WTO jurists may also apply the doctrine as a "relevant rule[ ] of interna-
tional law applicable in the relations between the parties." VCLT, supra note 30,
art. 31(3)(c). As discussed, infra Section III, WTO scholars concede that the VCLT
rules on treaty interpretation are relevant to TRIPS disputes.
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or not WTO law is self-contained can be divided into contrasting
schools of thought, each of which lie on a continuum.132 At one
end, a number of scholars believe that the WTO is self-contained
and completely isolated from general international law.133 Under
this view, WTO jurists are restricted to applying WTO law in WTO
disputes and cannot, except in very narrow circumstances, con-
sider other rules of international law.134 We will call these advo-
cates "interpretive conservatives." 135 Proponents of this view in-
clude Trachtman and Kelly, who argue that the language in the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes ("DSU") and the specific references to WTO law in
WTO agreements provide clear support for using only WTO law in
WTO dispute resolution. 136
132 See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Prop-
erty and Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 TEMP.
L. REV. 363, 367 (2004) (" [There is a] lively debate among scholars of international
law about the boundaries of the WTO and the extent to which declarations, laws,
and regulations promulgated in other venues are relevant to WTO delibera-
tions.").
133 Whether WTO law should refer to other non-WTO law is referred to by
trade specialists as "interpretive linkage." This is defined as "doctrinal arguments
that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body needs to interpret relevant trade rules in
light of other substantive rules of public international law because trade, after all,
is not a 'self-contained regime."' Jos6 E. Alvarez, Foreword: The Boundaries of the
WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2002). See also David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 5, 21 (2002) (discussing principles of treaty interpretation and their impact
on linkage between multilateral agreements).
134 See Michael Lennard, Navigating By the Stars: The WTO Agreements, 5 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17, 41 (2002) (arguing that Article 3.2 is narrowly framed as refer-
ring only to sources of law bearing upon interpretation and arguing that "other
sources of international law must fall for consideration under another head");
Gabrielle Marceau, IFO Agreements Cannot Be Interpreted in Clinical Isolation from
Public International Law, (World Bank Seminar on International Trade Law) (Oct.
24-25, 2000) [hereinafter Marceau, WTO Agreements] ("Under the [Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU")], only
provisions of the 'covered agreements' can be the 'applicable law' applied and en-
forced by panels and the Appellate Body."); Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coher-
ence in International Law: Praises for the Prohibition Against "Clinical Isolation" in
TO Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 87, 110 (1999) [hereinafter Marceau,
Call for Coherence] (arguing that the WTO adjudicating bodies may not apply or
enforce all sources of law and that Article 7(2) of the DSU only allows the WTO to
consider "covered agreements").
135 The term "interpretive conservatives" and the term "interpretive liberals"
have no relation to the broader political terms "conservatives" and "liberals."
They are used to denote proponents of a limited and expanded view of WTO in-
terpretive jurisdiction, respectively.
136 Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WVTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L.
L.J. 333, 342 (1999) (arguing that the text of the DSU holds that WTO adjudicating
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3.2.1.1.1. Textual and legal support
Interpretive conservatives argue that DSU Articles 3(2), 7, and
11 support their position. Article 3(2) provides that the dispute set-
tlement system "serves to preserve the rights and obligations of
[m]embers under the covered agreements, and to clarify the exist-
ing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law."
137 It further
provides that "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the [Dispute Set-
tlement Body ("DSB")] cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements."
138 The phrase
"in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public in-
ternational law," they argue, allows incorporation of rules of inter-
pretation but does not allow the use of different substantive inter-
national law. Moreover, if WTO jurists incorporated non-WTO
norms into the WTO legal system, interpretive conservatives argue
that WTO members' rights would be diminished, in that incorpora-
tion would give priority to international norms over negotiated
rights. Kelly argues that incorporation would "violate the bargain
struck in the DSU."
13 9
Articles 7 and 11 provide further support by directing the WTO
panels to look to "covered agreements" -the WTO trade agree-
ments listed in Appendix I to the DSU--to determine whether
panel rulings are consistent with those covered agreements.
140
bodies may only apply WTO law). See also J. Patrick Kelly, Judicial Activism at the
World Trade Organization: Developing Principles of Self-Restraint, 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 353, 365 (2002) ("The provisions of the DSU defining the WTO legal system
are incompatible with both the incorporation of non-WTO norms as rules of deci-
sion and a creative interpretive role for the [Appellate Body].").
137 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 2, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations: The Legal Texts 404, 405 (1994), art. 3(2), 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1227 [hereinaf-
ter DSU].
138 Id.
139 Kelly, supra note 136, at 365. Kelly also states that the DSU authorizes a
"contractual approach" rather than the "incorporation approach," as evidenced
by the choice of paying compensation or facing retaliation to preserve a measure
of sovereignty and national autonomy. Id. at 364-65. However, it is not clear how
this is inconsistent with the incorporation of non-WTO norms and rules; incorpo-
rating such rules does not change a members' choice of responses to adverse WTO
decisions -it only affects the decisions themselves.
140 Article 7 provides that the role of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")
shall be "[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in... the covered
agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute[], the matter referred to the
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Trachtman argues that references to "covered agreements" counsel
against using non-WTO law. He contends that the language in the
DSU "would be absurd if rights and obligations arising from other
international law could be applied by the DSB," adding that
"[w]ith so much specific reference to the covered agreements as the
law applicable in WTO dispute resolution, it would be odd if the
members intended non-WTO law to be applicable."141
As Trachtman and others view it, WTO jurists may apply non-
WTO international law in only two contexts: (1) when referring to
customary rules of interpretation of international law and (2) when
such non-WTO law is incorporated by reference in WTO law (e.g.,
the specific references in TRIPS to other international intellectual
property treaties, such as the Berne, Paris, and Rome Conven-
tions) .142
3.2.1.1.2. Rationale
A core rationale for limiting reliance on non-WTO law to inter-
pret WTO provisions is that the WTO was developed through a
political process of negotiation among states and incorporating
non-WTO law would interfere with that process -undermining
state sovereignty and unfairly undoing agreements achieved dur-
ing the negotiation process.143 Kelly argues that such incorporation
DSB... and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recom-
mendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s)."
DSU art. 7. Article 11 provides that "a panel should make an objective assessment
of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case
and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agree-
ments ...." Id. art. 11.
141 Trachtman, supra note 136, at 342.
142 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 136, at 366 (describing the incorporation of cus-
tomary international rules of interpretation into WTO law). See also TRIPS arts. 2,
9. Kelly also recognizes the need to rely on non-WTO law to give definition to
vague or ambiguous terms (i.e., "interstitial" development). Kelly, supra note 136,
at 366. He distinguishes, however, between a WTO decision-making body deter-
mining policy left incomplete because the members failed to agree and the inter-
stitial development of vague standards; the former leaves intact the bargain struck
by the members while the latter diminishes the negotiated rights of the members.
Id. at 367-68.
143 See, e.g., Jos6 Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Ex-
panded Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (2001) (evaluating the arguments for
constitutionalization of the WTO); Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of
Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126 (2002) (arguing that some issues, such as intellectual
property rights under TRIPS, should not be included in the WTO because they are
too complex and have negative consequences for developing countries); Debra P.
Steger, Afterword: The "Trade and..." Conundrum - A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT'L
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amounts to nothing more than judicial activism by the Appellate
Body ("AB") or WTO panels. According to Kelly, this activism is
incompatible with democratic accountability and WTO legitimacy
because: (1) AB judges are not elected; (2) AB decisions are not
readily reversible by democratically accountable means; and (3)
Member States are deprived of their right to participate in policy
decisions. 144
WTO competence is another issue. Broadening WTO jurisdic-
tion will stretch limited WTO resources and may result in inconsis-
tency in international law.145 By applying non-WTO law, WTO
panels and the AB would be required to delve into areas where
they have little or no expertise. The appropriate judicial bodies for
adjudicating these areas are elsewhere.
1 46
L. 133, 140 (2002) (stating that the mandate of the WTO is limited to trade, expan-
sion of which would undermine the legitimacy of the system). See also Sell, supra
note 132, at 367 (arguing that principled argument is the best strategy for weak
countries striving to achieve change and also maintains the legitimacy of the
WTO).
144 See Kelly, supra note 136, at 368-70 (discussing the disadvantages of judi-
cial activism in the WTO context). See also Trachtman, supra note 136, at 333-34
(stating that WTO tribunals lack direct democratic legitimacy, which raises the
question of whether they should be determining the linkage between trade and
other important issues). The fear here is that while WTO dispute resolution helps
ensure that members comply with WTO rules, it also involves quasi-legislation,
which should be limited to matters that WTO members have already considered
and negotiated. Trachtman states that dispute resolution has two roles. First, it
"is necessary to the application of legislation." Id. at 339. In this role, Trachtman
writes, "dispute resolution is not important for its own sake but as the place
where legislation becomes binding and effective. Legislation without adjudica-
tion at least raises greater concerns regarding the application and effectiveness of
the legislation." Id. Trachtman continues that in its second role, dispute resolu-
tion "inevitably interprets and expands upon legislation. In a common law sys-
tem, indeed, dispute resolution amounts unabashedly to a type of legislation." Id.
145 Marceau has noted the risk of treating the Panels and the AB as "court[s]
of general jurisdiction" able to enforce non-WTO international law obligations.
Marceau, Call for Coherence, supra note 134, at 109-10. She has also expressed the
view that "[wihile the WTO should ensure that its interpretation and application
of WTO rules are consistent with public international law, permitting it to enforce
outside rules by providing remedies for breach of public international law would
threaten to overload the multilateral trading system." Id. at 111.
146 WTO adjudication may be bad for other areas of international law. For
example, the WTO may not understand how to interpret human rights, labor, or
environmental law treaties. Moreover, a common law system of adjudication may
not be the best way to elaborate norms for areas such as human rights or labor.
Allowing the WTO to interpret and apply non-WTO law may amount to anoint-
ing the WTO the "Supreme Court" of international law, perhaps implicitly privi-
leging trade law over other areas of law.
2006] 717
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
3.2.1.2. Arguments for incorporating non-WTO law into the
VVTO
At the other end of the spectrum, some scholars argue that
WTO law is a subset of international law. We shall call these
scholars "interpretive liberals." Interpretive liberals view WTO
agreements as the starting point for dispute settlement proceed-
ings. They argue that the sources of law contained in Article 38 of
the ICJ Statute - including general principles of law - all contribute
to WTO law.147 The major proponent of this view is Joost Pauwe-
lyn, the former Secretariat of the WTO's Legal Affairs Division.148
Pauwelyn and other interpretive liberals argue that principles
and laws developed elsewhere are relevant to interpreting TRIPS
because treaties, including WTO law, are "automatically born into
general international law."' 49 Moreover, general international law
serves a "secondary" gap-filling function -that is, it fills gaps left
by treaties and imposes certain default international rights and ob-
ligations on states. 150 Unless states contract out of general interna-
tional law, treaties are automatically subsumed both under general
international law and the wider corpus of public international
law.' 5l According to these scholars, the WTO was not "created in a
vacuum" but rather "emerged in the context of general interna-
147 See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 25 (2d ed. 1997)
(explaining that because product trade rules are "the most complex and extensive
international rules regarding any subject of international economic relations that
exist," it is logical that they would influence development of rules for other inter-
national economic areas, such as intellectual property under the WTO); Laurence
R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004) (arguing that soft law,
including counter-regime norms, developed in other fora may have an effect on
the way WTO jurists interpret TRIPS); Donald M. McRae, The WVTO in International
Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier? 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 27, 28 (2000) (finding
"some support in WTO agreements themselves for viewing the WTO within the
mainstream of international law").
148 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How
Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 538 (2001) (writing that "WTO law is 'just' a
branch of public international law").
149 Id. at 537.
150 Id. at 536.
151 Id. at 537. In addition to WTO rules that contract out of international law,
some WTO rules add to international law and confirm preexisting international
law. Id. at 540. Even for those that allow contracting out of international law,
Pauwelyn cautions that they can only contract out of one or more rules of general
international law, not the system of international law entirely. Id. at 539.
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tional law and other treaties ... "152
3.2.1.2.1. Textual and legal support
Interpretive liberals also rely on explicit WTO authority for
support. In fact, they rely upon the exact same provisions as the
interpretive conservatives. For example, Palmeter and Mavroidis
rely on Articles 3(2) and 7 to argue that because Article 3(2) re-
quires WTO panels to "clarify the provisions of [covered agree-
ments] 'in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law,"' WTO jurists can and must take into ac-
count public international law (e.g., the VCLT rules of treaty inter-
pretation). 53 Such rules, in turn, provide that jurists can rely on
"any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties." 15 4 Jurists argue that this approach unambi-
guously supports reference to international law as long as non-
WTO law is relevant for purposes of resolving WTO dispute.
55
152 Id. at 547.
153 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WATO Legal System: Sources of
Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 399 (1998). Interpretive liberals also argue that other
traditional sources of public international law have benefited WTO law, which
has become an important part of the larger system of public international law. Id.
at 413.
154 VCLT, supra note 30, art. 31(3)(c). Despite the interpretive liberal view
that WTO jurists may consider and incorporate other sources of international law,
Bartels argues that article 3(2) of the DSU is a general conflict clause that favors
WTO rules in cases where they conflict with international law outside covered
agreements. See Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceed-
ings, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 499, 506-07 (2001). In particular, the last sentence of Arti-
cle 3(2) prohibits the WTO panels from adding to or diminishing the rights and
obligations of parties to the dispute. As Pauwelyn notes, rather than address the
applicable law before the WTO panels, this language "deal[s] with the inherent
limits a WTO panel must observe in interpreting WTO covered agreements. In
exercising this judicial function of interpretation, WTO panels may clarify the
meaning of WTO covered agreements but they may not 'add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."' Pauwelyn, supra
note 148, at 564. Pauwelyn adds that "stating what the judiciary can do with the
law differs greatly from stating what the legislature (i.e., WTO members) has
done, or can do, with the law." Id.
155 In response to the interpretive liberal view that VCLT rules allow reliance
on any relevant international law, Trachtman states that the language only au-
thorizes the WTO panels to take into account rules of interpretation, not general
international law. "However, [DSU Articles 3(2) and 7] refer only to interpretation
of relevant provisions of WTO agreements 'in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.' They cannot be taken as making the
WTO dispute resolution system a court of general international law jurisdiction."
Trachtman, supra note 136, at 342 n.41 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
As to Pauwelyn's suggestion regarding Article 31(c), Trachtman argues that it "is
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Palmeter and Mavroidis also rely heavily on Article 7, which they
view as the "WTO substitute" for ICJ Article 38.156 Under this
view, custom and international agreements, along with general
principles of law, are available to resolve WTO disputes.
Schoenbaum addresses Article 11, which authorizes panels and
the AB to "make such other findings as will assist the DSB in mak-
ing... recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
the covered agreements." 157 He argues that through this grant of
authority, the WTO provides implied powers that require WTO ju-
rists to decide all international legal issues involved in a dispute
properly before them.158 As for WTO competence, Schoenbaum
argues that it is appropriate for WTO panels and the AB to decide
legal questions not relating to a WTO agreement to avoid "piece-
taken as reflective of customary rules of interpretation" but "refers to applicable
international law ... only to indicate what materials should be taken into account
in interpreting treaty texts." Id. at 343. Even though he concludes that Article 3(2)
does not bring in other sources of international law, Lennard concedes that "cus-
tomary international law and certain general principles of law may nevertheless
apply in WTO relationships, as a legal environment into which the WTO agree-
ments were 'born', and which still applies to the extent that it is consistent with
the WTO Agreement (or, in the case of jus cogens, even if there is inconsistency)."
Lennard, supra note 134, at 41. In response to the view that the explicit reference
to international law is solely for interpretation and thus necessarily excludes other
international law, Lennard states that this reading is neither necessary nor appro-
priate. Differences in the treatment of international law rules of interpretation
and other substantive international law "can be explained by the fact that the cus-
tomary international law rules of treaty interpretation (as encapsulated in the Vi-
enna Convention) were more likely to be in the minds of negotiators" and that
this difference did not carry "any negative implication for other customary inter-
national law and general principles of law to the extent that they are consistent
with the text of the WTO Agreements, even though sourced outside the WTO
Agreement." Id. at 42; see also Pauwelyn, supra note 148, at 538 (stating that it is
irrelevant whether WTO treaty negotiators considered public international law
when drafting the treaty, and that this issue at most is an excuse used to justify a
lack of focus on the relationship between WTO rules and other principles of inter-
national law).
156 Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 153, at 399 (explaining the role of ICJ
Article 38(1) and comparing it to Articles 3(2) and 7 of the DSU).
157 DSU art. 11.
158 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for
Reform, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 647, 653 (1998) (stating that Article 11 of the DSU "is
an 'implied powers' clause which should be interpreted broadly so that the panels
and Appellate Body can decide all aspects of a dispute."). Trachtman has a re-
sponse to the view put forth by Schoenbaum: "[w]hile Schoenbaum adduces rea-
sons why this should be so, this instruction to make 'such other findings' is too
general to overcome the more specific language of the DSU limiting panels and
the Appellate Body to the 'covered agreements.'" Trachtman, supra note 136, at
342 n.41 (emphasis in original).
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meal decision-making" that leaves relevant legal questions in-
volved in a dispute undecided.15 9 Incorporation of non-WTO law
is circumscribed, however, in that "non-WTO rules cannot add
meaning to WTO rules that goes [sic] either beyond or against the
'clear meaning of the terms' of WTO covered agreements."' 160
3.2.1.2.2. Rationale
In addition to the fact that international law is a backstop for
WTO law and that the WTO benefits by having recourse to other
traditional sources of public international law, Helfer provides a
normative and political justification for relying on non-WTO law in
resolving WTO disputes and provides a means to incorporate non-
WTO "soft" law into WTO "hard" law. Heifer argues that coun-
tries "regime-shift" (i.e., use norms developed in other regimes to
help define or inform norms created in the WTO). In other words,
countries, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), consumer
advocate groups, and others attempt to generate "counter-WTO
norms" (i.e., norms that fill gaps) in other fora and then push to
have WTO panels rely on these norms. Heifer notes that the
United States regime-shifted in moving intellectual property from
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") to the
WTO.
1 6 1
As shown, there is a vigorous debate regarding the proper ap-
plication of international law to WTO disputes. While both sides
make strong arguments, it is hard to look past the explicit reference
in DSU Article 3(2) to general international law, e.g., the VCLT
rules. These rules provide that jurists can rely on "any relevant
rule of international law,"162 and can inform the meaning and effect
of WTO provisions. Non-WTO law rules are tethered to WTO
agreements by the proviso that they must be "relevant." Further,
arguments regarding WTO competency and judicial activism,
while important, focus on why WTO jurists should not incorporate
non-WTO law rather than whether WTO jurists can incorporate
159 Schoenbaum, supra note 158, at 653 (noting that the implied powers
stemming from DSU Article 11 allow WTO panels and the AB to avoid leaving
some relevant legal questions unanswered).
160 Pauwelyn, supra note 148, at 573 (explaining that non-WTO rules cannot
override WTO rules).
161 Helfer, supra note 147, at 7 (commenting that more powerful states are
more adept at regime-shifting than others).
162 VCLT, supra note 30, art. 31(3)(c).
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non-WTO law.
Moreover, if WTO practice and law in action is any indication,
WTO panels and the AB have answered the question by routinely
referring to and applying rules of general or public international
law. For example, the WTO panels and the AB have used custom-
ary international law (e.g., VCLT Articles 31 and 32) as well as gen-
eral principles of law (e.g., estoppel) to support their reasoning 163
in cases such as Canada Patent Term, 64 India Pharmaceutical Pat-
ents,165 U.S. Shrimp-Turtle,166 and U.S. Reformulated Gasoline.167 Most
163 The practice of using customary international law and general principles
of law also extends to prior GATT decisions. Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note
153, at 408 ("On occasion GATT panels have invoked general principles of law in
support of their reasoning ..."); Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, at 16-17 (Apr. 29,
1996) (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter United States Reformulated Gasoline]
(stating that a VCLT provision has become a rule of customary or general interna-
tional law, and thus is part of the body of law on which the AB should rely when
interpreting covered agreements); Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alco-
holic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, at 6 (Oct. 4, 1996) (adopted
Nov. 1, 1996) (interpreting GATT Article 111:2 in accordance with "customary rules
of interpretation of public international law," as required under DSU art. 3(2));
Appellate Body Report, United States- Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-
Made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, at 16 (Feb. 10, 1997) (adopted Feb. 25,
1997) (citing as a basis for decision the general principle of effectiveness in treaty
interpretation).
164 Appellate Body Report, Canada -Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/
AB/R, para. 71-74 (Sept. 18, 2000) (discussing the current applicability of the
VCLT in the WTO context and the non-retroactivity of TRIPS).
165 Appellate Body Report, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Ag-
ricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 17, 1997) [hereinafter India
Pharmaceutical Patents]. The Appellate Body here also advised that the "princi-
ples of interpretation [in the VCLT] neither require nor condone the imputation
into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of con-
cepts that were not intended." Id. 31.
166 Appellate Body Report, United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
167 United States Reformulated Gasoline, art. 31 (" [T]he General Agreement is
not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law."); cf. Panel Re-
port, European Communities -Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry
Products, WT/DS69/R, para. 81 (July 23, 1998) [hereinafter Poultry Products]
(holding that a tariff agreement settling a matter between two WTO members
does not constitute WTO law applicable by a panel). Even in Poultry Products, the
Appellate Body "allowed that the Oilseeds Agreement might serve as a supple-
mentary means of interpretation of WTO law"; however, Trachtman writes that
the AB "did not apply the Oilseeds Agreements itself as law." Trachtman, supra
note 136, at 343 n.46. While arguing that the WTO agreements "do not exhaust
the sources of potentially relevant law," Palmeter and Mavroidis note that virtu-
ally all the sources of law in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute have served as sources
of law in the WTO to varying degrees. Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra note 153, at
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recently, the WTO panel in European Communities - Measures Affect-
ing the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,168 addressed this
specific issue as follows:
Article 31(3)(c) directly speaks to the issue of relevance of
other rules of international law to the interpretation of a
treaty. In considering the provisions of Article 31(3)(c), we
note, initially, that it refers to "rules of international law."
Textually, this references seems sufficiently broad to en-
compass all generally accepted sources of public interna-
tional law, that is to say, (i) international conventions (trea-
ties), (ii) international custom (customary international
law), and (iii) the recognized general principles of law. In
our view, there can be no doubt that treaties and customary
rules of international law are "rules of international law"
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c).169
With specific regard to general principles -which it is argued
here includes the treaties of adhesion doctrine- the panel stated:
Regarding the recognized general principles of law which
are applicable in international law, it may not appear self-
evident that they can be considered as "rules of interna-
tional law" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c). How-
ever, the Appellate Body is US Shrimp made it clear that
pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) general principles of interna-
tional law are to be taken into account in the interpretation
of WTO provisions.
170
Accordingly, the WTO can apply treaties of adhesion doctrine
to WTO disputes.
399. Of course, one can argue that there are instances where a panel could have
but did not look to outside law and thus this might support the interpretive con-
servative view. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 82, 156 (Jan. 16,
1998) (stating that the panel refused to rule on an issue, and that while panels are
inhibited from addressing claims that fall outside their terms of reference, nothing
in the DSU prohibits a panel from using arguments submitted by the parties or
from developing its own legal reasoning to support its conclusions).
168 Panel Report, European Communities -Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291-293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EU
Biotech Products].
169 EU Biotech Products 7.67.
170 Id.
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4. TREATIES OF ADHESION IN WTO TREATY INTERPRETATION
Having established that the contracts of adhesion doctrine can
appropriately be applied to international treaties and that, more
specifically, it can be applied to TRIPS, we now turn to whether
TRIPS is in fact a treaty of adhesion. The common elements dis-
tilled from the laws of various countries that possess the general
principle of the adhesion doctrine are: (1) a party with superior
bargaining position supplies or presents (2) a pre-formulated or
form contract (3) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This also applies to
many international treaties. The treaty of adhesion doctrine, as de-
lineated here, is not so broad. An unenforceable treaty of adhesion
must also include the following additional elements: the weaker
party (4) lacks the negotiating power to reformulate contract terms
which are (5) onerous or unfavorable, or inconsistent with the rea-
sonable expectations of the weaker party and results in unfair sur-
prise. TRIPS satisfies these elements.
4.1. TRIPS
Developed in 1994 under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") Uruguay Round trade negotiations, TRIPS is un-
questionably the most important development in international in-
tellectual property law since the international intellectual property
treaties of the 1880's (e.g., the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property and the 1886 Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works). TRIPS significantly
strengthens intellectual property rights worldwide. 171
TRIPS is an attempt to reconcile varying levels of intellectual
property protection and enforcement. The varying levels are due
to each country's widely different goals, values, histories, cultures,
political climates, and economic and technological stages of devel-
opment. To reconcile these varying interests, TRIPS mandates that
all countries provide intellectual property protection at specified
levels significantly beyond those previously established in any in-
ternational intellectual property treaty. Arguably, this was accom-
171 TRIPS initially began as an effort to curb misappropriation, particularly in
the trademark context, with an intent to "extract greater technology rents from
developing countries." Abbott, supra note 8, at 473. However, the negotiations
very quickly "outgrew the original vision" and were "extended to meet the spe-
cific interests of intellectual property owners amid competing, if unacknow-
ledged, policy objectives." Okediji, supra note 10, at 856.
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plished through a flawed bargaining process where developed
countries coerced developing countries into adopting the treaty.
4.1.1. Developed countries had superior bargaining power
There is no question that at the TRIPS negotiations unequal
bargaining power existed between the developing and developed
countries. This should come as no surprise, as the classical realist
view posits that international relations are predicated on power in-
equities.172 The decision to move intellectual property from WIPO
to the WTO exacerbated this power imbalance.
Prior to 1994, intellectual property matters fell under the pur-
view of WIPO. Because the United States and the EU considered
the United Nations ("UN") and its organizations hostile -or, at the
very least, indifferent-to developed countries and overly sympa-
thetic to developing countries, the United States began efforts to
move intellectual property from WIPO to GATT. GATT's trade re-
gime traditionally favored developed countries with large, attrac-
tive export markets. In addition to being a more favorable forum,
GATT included the relatively strong and effective enforcement
mechanisms lacking in WIPO.173 Those mechanisms were one of
the prizes sought by the developed countries in TRIPS. The move
from WIPO to GATT was monumental, allowing developed coun-
tries to flaunt their trade advantage and superior bargaining posi-
tion within the context of intellectual property rights, inevitably
producing an intellectual property treaty slanted in their favor.
That superior bargaining position was considerably augmented
by the development of a negotiating bloc made up of developed
countries. The United States, the EU, and Japan consistently ap-
proached GATT negotiations by first developing a "shared posi-
tion."174 This bloc employed a similar strategy during the TRIPS
negotiations, where there was extensive coordination among these
groups "as well as the evolution of common negotiating positions
172 See Okediji, supra note 10, at 838 (accounting for the role power plays in
politics). See, e.g., Wiessner, supra note 122.
173 See Doris E. Long, Copyright and the Uruguay Round Agreements: A New Era
of Protection or an Illusory Promise?, 22 AIPLA. Q.J. 531, 536 (1994) (explaining the
enhanced protection of intellectual property rights).
174 Abbott, supra note 8, at 480 (noting the common policy of powerful na-
tions).
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over the course of the round." 175 Many of these positions were
"'firmly considered nonnegotiable."1 76
Professor Okediji emphasizes the importance of the developed
country block. Grounding her analysis in game theory-
specifically, coalition formation theory -Professor Okediji states
that the TRIPS negotiations were characterized by the coordination
of developed countries to facilitate a common bargaining position.
"As with coordination games, developed countries, notwithstand-
ing their own policy differences, recognized that they were each
better off with an agreement than none. This resulted in coalitions
between developed countries that made negotiation of a global set
of standards a feasible objective."177
Thus, developed countries, already possessing strong negotiat-
ing positions by virtue of their large trade markets, had an even
stronger position with their new intellectual property coalition.
Under these circumstances, the first element of the treaty of adhe-
sion doctrine is easily satisfied.
4.1.2. Pre-formulated contract
Perhaps more problematic is the second element -that a stan-
dard or pre-formulated contract exists. Initially, it should be noted
that this is not an essential element, just one that is sometimes pre-
sent in many forms of adhesion contracts. Because the stronger
party has the time and expert advice to prepare the standard con-
tract in advance, it facilitates the imposition of onerous terms and
makes the imbalance in parties' rights possible. Arguably, this
element was also satisfied during the TRIPS negotiations.
The United States and other developed countries often prepare
model agreements covering particular subjects. These model
agreements can be adapted to the specific circumstances of future
negotiations, particularly in bilateral trade negotiations between a
strong and a weak state. 178 Usually, this is the starting point for the
175 Id. at 480 n.45 (mentioning the preference of the powerful nations to come
to agreement on basic issues).
176 Id.
177 Okediji, supra note 10, at 829 ("The shared objective of heightened global
standards for intellectual property engendered a cooperative game among devel-
oped countries during the TRIPS negotiations.").
178 See GRAEME DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW AND POLICY 57 (2001) (arguing for greater flexibility for courts to fashion
transational solutions to transnational disputes).
[Vol. 27:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss3/2
TRIPS AND TREATIES OF ADHESION
negotiations. 179 In the TRIPS negotiations, the two dominant trade
powers, the EU and the United States, each tabled a draft treaty
text considered "the spark which ignited the work towards the
TRIPS Agreement."1 80 The similarity between the two was unmis-
takable and strongly suggests that "transatlantic consultation had
preceded the tabling of both documents."
18'
Not coincidentally, the TRIPS Negotiating Group adopted the
structure of these documents, which, subject to few changes, pro-
vided the framework for what became TRIPS, despite developing
country concerns and serious policy objections.18
2 In fact, the de-
veloping countries felt that the official draft text, because it
adopted the structure supplied by the United States and the EU,
was biased and that the Negotiation Group Chairman had "taken
sides."183 Finally, even though the drafts were only supposed to be
a starting point for negotiations, TRIPS "closely resembled" the
starting proposal, suggesting that developing countries had very
little opportunity to negotiate and no option but to accept TRIPS
terms.184
4.1.3. TRIPS was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
The first two elements lead inexorably to the third- TRIPS was
presented to developing countries on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
With respect to this, it is clear that developing countries had no
meaningful choice but complete adherence to TRIPS. Indeed,
179 Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property
Standard-setting, 17-18 (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Study Paper
8). Drahos notes that the United States has very strong incentives to prepare
standardized bilateral treaty standards and has developed models or prototypes
of bilateral treaties is wishes to have with other countries.
180 DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS,
16 (2d ed. 2003) (1998).
181 Id. at 16; see also Abbott, supra note 8, at 480 (noting that the United States
and the European Union had a "shared position" during the negotiation process).
182 See Okediji, supra note 11, at 848-49 (discussing the process by which the
agreements were adopted).
183 GERVAIS, supra note 180, at 18-19. It also could be argued that the TRIPS
Chairman "took sides" when presenting a draft to the Negotiating Group; in the
combined draft, the developed country approach was identified as the "A" ap-
proach while developing country approach was identified as the "B" approach to
intellectual property issues.
184 See Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual Property Protection
in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 477 (1995) (not-
ing that "[t]he proposed TRIPS Agreement provides minimum standards...
closely match[ing] the initial proposal of the United States.").
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TRIPS was the only game in town -it was part of an overall WTO
package that had to be accepted in its entirety. In other words, if
developing countries desired to become WTO members, they
could not, as in previous GATT practice, choose the individual
agreements they wished to adopt. Instead, they had to adopt each
and every WTO agreement, including TRIPS.
4.1.4. Developing countries lacked negotiating power
4.1.4.1. Developing countries did not fully participate during the
negotiations
The TRIPS negotiations were not generally atypical as far as
treaty negotiations are concerned. However, three factors trans-
form TRIPS into a treaty of adhesion: (1) the utter lack of bargain-
ing power and the absence of many developing countries from the
entire negotiation process; (2) the repressive economic coercion
used against developing countries; and (3) unfair and unforesee-
able future effects resulting from TRIPS, enabled by the lack of in-
formation presented to the developing countries throughout the
process.
The move from WIPO to the WTO, the developed party coali-
tion, and the lack of viable alternatives to the WTO all contributed
to developing countries' lack of bargaining power. Furthermore,
many developing countries were not even part of TRIPS negotia-
tions and those that were suffered from a lack of information.18s5
Regarding the lack of participation, Drahos notes the absence
of many developing countries, particularly the African states, dur-
ing critical TRIPS negotiations:186
185 Drahos and Braithwaite argue that for TRIPS -indeed, for any system of
property rights -to be a force that positively impacts the public good, it must be
the result of a democratic process. A democratic process, which is likely to have
more efficient property rights, must meet three conditions: "(1) all relevant inter-
ests must be represented in the negotiation of the property rights; (2) all involved
in the negotiation must have full information about the consequences of various
possible outcomes; and (3) one party must not coerce the others." PETER DRAHOS
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY? 190 (2003). As commentators point out, TRIPS met none of these con-
ditions.
186 Early developing country participation (e.g., participation from Brazil,
Argentina, and India) involved little more than opposing including intellectual
property matters within the GATT framework. GERVAIS, supra note 180, at 10, 16.
Thailand and Mexico also expressed concern over the scope of intellectual prop-
erty inclusion, seeking a more limited scope. Id. at 14.
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Egypt and Tanzania were the two most active African
states. Neither could be described as a key player. Neither
was in the room for the most important or decisive meet-
ings that sentenced millions of African AIDS victims to
death for want of drugs that were placed beyond their
reach by monopoly profits extended by TRIPS patents....
The WTO formally meets the conditions of equal democ-
ratic representation for all states, but the informal reality
was that most states were not represented until the virtual
fait accompli of a chairman's draft was on the table.
187
The UN also noted that many developing countries were ab-
sent from the TRIPS negotiations. It observed that TRIPS and, in
particular, certain patent provisions in TRIPS, were "negotiated
with far too little participation from many developing countries
now feeling the impact of their conditions."
1 88 This was the result
of a flawed negotiation process.
4.1.4.2. The "Green Room" process
The TRIPS negotiations can be characterized by the so-called
"Green Room" process. Under this process, negotiators from all
involved countries bargain by facing each other across a table in
the Green Room on the main floor of the WTO building. Drafts are
exchanged, progress is noted, and differences are discussed.1
89 Not
being part of this process had obvious consequences for non-
engaged countries. The problems that resulted from this lack of
participation were exacerbated by the "circle of consensus" that fa-
cilitated the Green Room process.
A circle of consensus - used during GATT negotiations but
which "reached new heights"
190 during TRIPS negotiations-
involves small groups coming together to build consensus, then
slowly incorporating other members until complete consensus is
achieved. 191 In the TRIPS scenario, the United States and the EU
187 See DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 185, at 190 (describing the devel-
opment of the "Green Room" process).
188 SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION 
OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 139-40 (2003) [hereinafter SELL, PRIVATE POWER,
PUBLIC LAW].
189 DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 185, at 137.
190 Drahos, supra note 179, at 11.
191 Drahos and Braithwaite describe this process as follows:
[Aln inner circle consensus [of the Big Three--the US, European Eco-
nomic Community, and Japan] was expanded to create larger circles of
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first reconciled their differences. Then the EU, United States, and
Japan agreed. After this, the "Quad" states -the United States, the
EU, Japan, and Canada -came together. Next, the "Friends of In-
tellectual Property" -including the Quad, Australia, Switzerland,
the Nordic countries, and some developing countries -reached
consensus. Finally, the entire TRIPS negotiation group con-
vened.192 Thus, only when consensus was established among de-
veloped countries did most of the developing countries have input.
That input was necessarily limited and constrained by the consen-
sus already reached. 93
Gervais describes the process only slightly differently. He
points out that the primary negotiations involved only the princi-
pal actors: the United States, Japan, the EU, and Switzerland-
known as the "most interested parties."'194 Gervais argues that oth-
ers outside the group were only able to express their views at for-
mal meetings held much less frequently than the informal meet-
ings between the principal actors. Even then, Gervais notes that
the views communicated at these formal meetings had little impact
on the draft treaty itself. 95
Neither was the TRIPS negotiation process transparent to de-
veloping country participants. Here, Drahos complains that "the
claim that the TRIPS negotiations were a model of transparency is
difficult to defend. In truth, it was the transparency of a one-way
mirror."196 This was due to the consensus building process that al-
lowed the United States to move easily among groups when it
seemed appropriate to do so.
consensus until the goals of those in the inner circle had been met. De-
veloping countries for the most part found themselves in outer circles, if
they made it into a circle at all.
DRAHOS & BRArrHWAITE, supra note 185, at 137.
192 Id. at 137-38.
193 Of course, there were disagreements between the developed countries as
well. The so-called "North-North" issues included proposals to create an exclu-
sive long-term rental right on sound recordings (Japan-United States) and impos-
ing a levy on private copying onto blank audio tapes and recording equipment
(EU-United States). GERVAIS, supra note 180, at 24. Moreover, many North-North
issues did not fully manifest until the enforcement stage of TRIPS. Okediji, supra
note 10, at 854.
194 GERVAIS, supra note 180, at 13, 19-23. The group was also known as the
"10 + 10" group. Id.
195 Id. at 20.
196 Drahos, supra note 179, at 12.
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4.1.4.3. Developing countries did not have "full information"
Developing countries also suffered from an alarming lack of in-
formation. In part, the lack of information was due to the fact that
intellectual property was being moved to the WTO, which histori-
cally treated trade issues only. In this regard, Gervais points out
that the developing countries
realised that, if the negotiation of an important part of the
area known as "intellectual property" was to be undertaken
in the GATT framework, much more information on the
possible scope and current problems was necessary. Trade
negotiators had to deal with a highly technical and complex
field, quite different from those traditionally handled by
GATT.197
Along the same lines, Drahos portrays the TRIPS negotiation
process as one in which developing country participants lacked
"full information" about the contents and consequences of TRIPS.
Using a theory of democratic property rights, he argues that effi-
ciently defined property rights consistent with democratic princi-
ples are more likely to emerge if three separate conditions are met:
(1) all relevant interests are represented during negotiations -the
condition of representation; (2) all participants have full informa-
tion about the consequences of various possible outcomes-the
condition of full information; and (3) one party cannot coerce other
parties-the condition on non-domination. Drahos concludes that
the TRIPS negotiations did not meet these conditions, particularly
conditions two and three. 198 For example, he notes that the African
states that signed TRIPS did not fully understand its implications,
particularly on such issues as its impact on their citizens' health.
199
This was the result of the United States and the EU providing mis-
information, thereby placing a shroud over TRIPS that created a
"veil of ignorance" for many developing countries.200 This was
also the result of the structural biases inherent in the international
197 WIPO provided some of this information, particularly regarding the Paris
and Berne Conventions. GERVAIS, supra note 180, at 13 (citations omitted).
198 See Drahos, supra note 179, at 10-14 (describing how developing countries
did not have full information and were coerced by other parties).
199 DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 185, at 191.
200 Id.
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system, including the inability of developing countries to develop
internal WTO legal expertise because of a lack of resources. 201
4.1.4.4. Section 301 actions202
Standard forms, superior bargaining position, and lack of nego-
tiation power are all indications of a treaty of adhesion. As seen
earlier, however, this is only the beginning of the analysis; some-
thing more must accompany these factors. The economic coercion
applied by developed countries solidified the treaty as one of ad-
hesion.
Good faith is an overarching and fundamental principle in
nearly all legal systems; it also underlies the treaty of adhesion
doctrine.2 3 While trade negotiations are about hard coercive bar-
gaining, "[g]ood faith forbids exacting a hard bargain."204 The
TRIPS negotiations went beyond extracting a hard bargain to ap-
plying oppressive economic coercion. The oppression came in the
form of U.S. Section 301 actions, threats to withdraw foreign direct
investment, and threats to close off the markets of crucial industri-
alized nations.
A number of scholars have described this coercive process.205
These scholars note that it began as early as the 1980s, when the
201 Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institu-
tional Approach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130, 137 (Michael N. Barnett &
Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
202 "Section 301" refers to Title III, Chapter 1, of the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. § 2411 (2000) [hereinafter Trade Act]. It provides that when a foreign coun-
try denies rights owed to the United States under a trade agreement, unfairly re-
stricts U.S. foreign commerce, or denies adequate and effective protection for in-
tellectual property rights held under U.S. law, the United States can take various
retaliatory actions. Notably, these actions may be taken without a breach of an
international agreement. While this section focuses on actions taken by the
United States under Section 301, it should be noted that the EU enacted a similar
statute called Council Regulation 264/84. According to Drahos, however, "the
Commission found it difficult to obtain consensus on its use," even though it did
move against Thailand and Indonesia for record piracy. Drahos, supra note 179, at
13.
203 See supra Section 3.1.2.2.
204 Ralph A. Newman, The Precepts of Equity, in THE INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 496, 497 (Abbott et
al. eds., 1999) ("The bargaining process is looked upon as a transaction between
persons... neither of whom need bargain under the pressure of controlling eco-
nomic compulsion exerted by his adversary, even though such compulsion does
not amount to the concepts of duress or undue influence of strict law.").
205 See, e.g., DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 185; SELL, PRIVATE POWER,
PUBLIC LAW, supra note 188; SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH
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United States coerced developing countries into agreeing to mini-
mum intellectual property standards by threatening to close its
borders to these countries if they did not.
20 6
The coercion and retaliatory trade sanctions were part of the
strategy of the United States to achieve increased intellectual prop-
erty protection worldwide.20 7  Unilaterally, the United States
strengthened its domestic laws to promote U.S. intellectual prop-
erty rights abroad. 208 To apply pressure on recalcitrant countries,
the United States used Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act ("Section
301"), which allows the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") to take
retaliatory trade action against a foreign country that failed to pro-
tect U.S. intellectual property rights.20 9 These actions include: (1)
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998) [hereinafter SELL, POWER
AND IDEAS]; Frederick Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 469 (2002).
206 See, e.g., Sell, supra note 132 (describing how developing countries had to
choose between agreeing to the terms in TRIPS and losing trade capabilities); see
also SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 205, at 175, 183; MICHAEL RYAN, KNOWLEDGE
DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 68
(1998) (emphasizing that the developing countries only became members of TRIPS
because the alternative of not becoming members left them in a worse position -
no access to the United States market and retaliatory trade sanctions for failing to
raise their intellectual property standards).
207 DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 185, at 191. The United States relies on
Section 301 to decrease opposition to TRIPS. The United States often threatens to
impose trade sanctions in order to negotiate bilateral treaties one by one, particu-
larly with those parties that might pose problems regarding the multilateral deals
(e.g., Korea, Brazil, and India). The United States is then in a position to enter the
multilateral negotiations "with a sequence of strategic bilaterals already having
made certain terms of the favoured multilateral deal a fait accompli." Id. The
multilateral deals pull those nations not subject to the bilateral negotiations to a
higher standard. Once the multilateral negotiations are completed, the United
States returns to a new round of bilateral negotiations and once again raises the
bar. One example of this bilateralism is the Free Trade Agreement the United
States signed with Jordan. In addition, the United States relied on bilateral
agreements to hasten the rate at which developing countries implement their
TRIPS obligations. Id.
208 See Heinz Klug, Patents and Pandemics: Can South Africa Survive Legal Har-
monization?, paper presented at the Rutgers University (Camden) law faculty
speakers series, Camden, February 12, 2001 (on file with author).
209 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (2000). Congress amended the
Trade Act three times-in 1979, 1984, and 1988-each time increasing the gov-
ernment's ability to retaliate against countries engaging in "unfair" trade prac-
tices, such as failing to protect intellectual property rights. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 818 (3d ed. 1995)
(listing Congress' changes to the Trade Act); Klug, supra note 208, at 13 (illustrat-
ing how the changed provisions allowed retaliation against South Africa); Ted L.
McDorman, U.S.-Thailand Trade Disputes: Applying Section 301 to Cigarettes and In-
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withdrawing benefits a foreign country enjoys because of a trade
agreement with the United States; (2) entering into new agree-
ments to eliminate the offending action; and (3) imposing duties or
other import restrictions against goods or an economic sector of the
foreign country. 210 Because many of the "target" countries are so
heavily dependent on access to the U.S. market, they are especially
vulnerable to U.S. threats.211
Bilateral negotiations on intellectual property started with Tai-
wan in 1983 and Singapore in 1984. In 1984, the United States
strengthened Section 301 because of pressure by the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. The United States immediately began using this ver-
sion against South Korea, demonstrating to the rest of its trade
partners what would happen if countries did not comply with U.S.
wishes. South Korea succumbed to this pressure and changed its
policies.
The United States again amended Section 301 in 1988 to give
the USTR additional powers with which to punish countries that
did not protect its intellectual property. This time, Brazil, a
staunch opponent of increased intellectual property protection, be-
came the example. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
initiated a Section 301 action against Brazil for its failure to ade-
quately protect pharmaceutical intellectual property rights. The
United States then punished Brazil for its failure to comply by im-
posing a 100% tariff on certain Brazilian imports, a retaliatory
measure that would cost Brazil a total of $39 million.212 Brazil suc-
cumbed to this pressure and changed its policies.
tellectual Property, 14 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 90 (1992) (describing how the United States
exerted pressure on Thailand).
210 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C § 2411(c) (2000).
211 See SELL, POWER AND IDEAS, supra note 205 (explaining that the target coun-
tries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Mexico, South Korea, and
Thailand). According to Sell, the percentage of trade that some developing coun-
tries have with the United States, as a function of total world trade it does, ranges
from 8% (China) to almost 70% (Mexico). Id. at 186. Indeed, it seems that the
United States is the biggest importer of most of target countries' goods (except
China). Moreover, with the exceptions of China and Mexico, none of these coun-
tries is a significant trading partner for the United States. Thus, the threats levied
by the United States carry significant weight. Id. at 182-87.
212 SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 188, at 108.
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In 1989, India became the next target.213 That year, the USTR
actually announced that the new Special 301 targets would be five
of the ten developing country "hardliners" in the GATT. These
"hardliners" included Brazil, India, Argentina, Egypt, and Yugo-
slavia.214 These countries were placed on the USTR's "watch list"
because of their opposition to increased intellectual property pro-
tection. The writing was on the wall for the remaining opponents.
As Ryan observed, "[o]ne did not have to be a chess grandmaster
to figure out that the gambit of opposing the United States on intel-
lectual property at the GATT would provoke a crushing reply."215
The pressure intensified during TRIPS negotiations. The in-
creasing threat that the United States might use Section 301 made
countries either immediately change their laws to be consistent
with U.S. demands or seek "protection" in the WTO.216 Develop-
ing countries-which "had serious dread" of the United States'
Section 301 bilateralism - were acutely aware that if they did not
sign TRIPS, they would have to individually "negotiate" with the
United States under threat of Section 301 actions.217 As Drahos
213 Id. at 109-10. Sell contends that the United States pressured India into ac-
cepting the TRIPS agreement, alleging that although the United States "initially
posed the choice of forum as one between WIPO and GATT," India, like other de-
veloping countries, "came to realize that in reality the choice was between GATT
and USTR...." Sell also points to the "glaring asymmetries in experience and
expertise" regarding intellectual property issues as another reason why develop-
ing countries eventually went along with TRIPS. Id.
214 Brazil and India were placed in the more serious category of priority
watch list, while Argentina, Egypt and Yugoslavia were put on the regular watch
list. RYAN, supra note 206, at 144. Ryan observes that the USTR used Section 301
against Brazil and South Korea "to bully the developing countries to the GATT
negotiating table. The action was intended to signal that negotiations could go on
one-by-one under threat of bilateral trade sanctions or they could take place
within the GATT round, but negotiations would take place." Id. at 108.
215 Id. at 144. See also DRAHOS AND BRAITHWAITE, supra note 185, at 12 ("The
resistance of developing countries was crushed through trade power.").
216 The threat of Section 301 sanctions pressured dozens of several develop-
ing countries into changing their intellectual property laws before TRIPS was even
enacted. RYAN, supra note 206, at 144. However, as both Ryan and Sell note, even
though countries revised their laws, neither have changed their minds and the en-
forcement of these new laws is minimal at best. Id. According to Sell, developing
countries have changed their laws, but not their minds, in response to U.S. pres-
sure, doing only the minimum required to avoid sanctions. Sell, supra note 132, at
370-71.
217 See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 46, at 788 (citing a study that shows Section
301 successfully used to achieve negotiating objectives in half of the time, in liber-
alizing trade one-third of the time, and that the United States only imposed actual
sanctions in a little over one-tenth of the time). See also DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE,
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notes, "[i]f they did not negotiate multilaterally they would each
have to face the [United States] alone. If they resisted the [United
States] multilaterally they could expect to be on the receiving end
of a [Section] 301 action. This was anything but a veiled threat by
the US."218 The U.S. strategy succeeded in convincing developing
countries to adopt TRIPS.
4.1.5. TRIPS has onerous and unfavorable terms
Developed countries cannot contend that TRIPS's effects and
consequences were within the reasonable expectations of the de-
veloping countries when they signed. TRIPS patent provisions, for
supra note 185, at 194 ("The [U.S.] line was that it was only the want of a credible
multilateral agreement that forced it to throw its weight around bilaterally.").
218 DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 185, at 136. In general, policy makers
in developing countries did not like TRIPS. However, the Uruguay Round pack-
age was more favorable to these countries. Of particular appeal were the proce-
dures for dispute settlement, which would safeguard against the Section 301 trade
sanctions used to instill U.S. policy. The package also liberalized the international
trade of textiles, accomplished by phasing-out of the Multifiber Arrangements.
See RYAN, supra note 206, at 112 ("The creation of the World Trade Organization
conferred a new international legitimacy to the international organization of trade
and signing the Uruguay round agreement made a country a founding member of
the new organization."). See also Frederick M. Abbott, The WVTO TRIPS Agreement
and Global Economic Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL
INTEGRATION 41-42 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997) (finding
that because the WTO agreement mandates that members use the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism to settle trade disputes, developing countries believed that
if they signed TRIPS, the United States would abide by the WTO dispute mecha-
nism as opposed to unilaterally applying trade sanctions). As it turned out, how-
ever, not only did the United States use Section 301 aggressively, it also pushed
for even more favorable conditions, a situation commonly referred to as "TRIPS-
plus." It also increased the pressure to create bilateral programs protecting intel-
lectual property even after TRIPS was concluded. The strategy of the United
States was to employ both bilateral and multilateral treaties; knowing this, one
might assume that the developing states were nafve to trust in the multilateral
agreements. However, these countries had few alternatives. See DRAHOS &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 185, at 194 ("Bilateralism is like cooking an elephant and
rabbit stew: however you mix the ingredients, it ends up tasting like elephant.
Multilateralism is the only prospect for constraining the elephant by rules under
which it agrees to submit to binding arbitration."). Compliance did not preclude
Section 301 actions:
Indeed, section 314(c) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which
implemented the GATT Agreement, amended the Trade Act to provide
expressly that a failure to provide adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property could still trigger Special 301 measures "notwith-
standing the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the
specific obligation of the TRIPS Agreement."
DINWOODIE, ET AL., supra note 178, at 809.
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example, greatly expanded the definition of patentable subject
matter to include inventions in "all fields of technology," 219 which
prevented developing countries from excluding medicines from in-
tellectual property protection, limited the means by which devel-
oping countries could access products from other countries (e.g.,
parallel importation and compulsory licensing), and lengthened
the term of protection to twenty years. While only providing a
glimpse of the unfavorable consequences of TRIPS provisions, the
patent clauses offer a valuable example of the treaty's harmful ef-
fects- eliminating, for instance, the ability of developing countries
to provide medicines to their citizens. One can legitimately ques-
tion whether these effects were foreseen by developing countries
when they signed TRIPS. The idea that these countries did not re-
alize the full impact that TRIPS would have is evidenced by the
fact that "no responsible government with a choice would place
the public health of its citizens below the interests of a few patent
holders." 220 The UN laments that the ink was dry on TRIPS "be-
fore most governments and people understood the social and eco-
nomic implications of patents on life."
221
4.2. Distributive Fairness
To the extent that distributive fairness concerns inform the ap-
plication of the treaty of adhesion doctrine, TRIPS reflects an un-
derlying distribution of power and resources that "offends our
conception of distributive fairness." 222 TRIPS involves more than
coveting a neighbor's painting; it involves distribution and control
219 TRIPS art. 27.
220 Abbott, supra note 8, at 488.
221 SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 188, at 139. But cf. Okediji,
supra note 10, at 839-40 ("Rationalizations that depict the TRIPS Agreement as an-
other example of North-South power disparities tell a much too simple story. In-
deed, one of the noted triumphs of the Uruguay Round was the unprecedented
level of developing country participation in the negotiations ...."). India and
Brazil were major participants during the negotiations and addressed concerns
peculiar to many developing countries. Abbott, supra note 8, at 470 n.5. However,
these countries did not necessarily represent the concerns of all developing coun-
tries and, in the end, also fell victim to the flawed negotiating process. Gervais
notes that in 1992--four years after negotiations began-India voiced concerns
about TRIPS, particularly about the compulsory licensing provisions, and refused
to accept the TRIPS package. Despite these concerns, the 1992 Agreement was not
modified substantially and the previous agreement, modeled on the EU/U.S.
draft, became the basis for the TRIPS Agreement. GERVAIS, supra note 180, at 25-
26. See also Drahos, supra note 179, at 11.
222 Kronman, supra note 21, at 772.
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over important resources, each of which affects critical aspects of
society: access to essential medicines; technological and economic
development; transfer of technology; and sovereignty and global
governance-related issues (e.g., the ability of states to determine for
themselves which issues take precedence and where to allocate
scarce resources). In this regard, it is noteworthy that the interna-
tional community has applied equitable principles to resources; in
particular, we have witnessed in international tribunals the emer-
gence of principles for the equitable sharing of rivers, lakes, and
ground waters that are a common resource of two or more states.223
Intellectual property deserves the same treatment. Moreover,
TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 refer to equitable sharing as a goal (if not an
implicit obligation) of the parties.
TRIPS is rife with procedural infirmities and grossly unjust
terms. Developed countries control intellectual property, trans-
ferred intellectual property bargaining from WIPO to WTO,
formed a negotiation block to produce TRIPS, and procured TRIPS
through economic coercion of developing countries, which had lit-
tle choice but to accept the treaty's one-sided provisions. While
there are strong arguments to the contrary,224 the more compelling
conclusion is that TRIPS is a treaty of adhesion. If this is true, what
effect, if any, should this conclusion have? This article concludes
with some brief and modest suggestions as to how TRIPS panels
and the AB might apply the treaty of adhesion doctrine in resolv-
ing TRIPS disputes and addresses some possible criticisms of this
new doctrine.
5. APPLYING THE TREATY OF ADHESION DOCTRINE
Construing TRIPS as a treaty of adhesion requires that WTO
decision-making bodies interpret the treaty in favor of developing
countries or against developed countries-the contra proferentum
principle. Thus, the WTO can use the adhesion doctrine as an in-
terpretive aid rather than an exit option for developing countries.
This recognizes that developing WTO member states need not re-
pudiate all WTO protections in order to avoid the problems with
TRIPS and is consistent with the fundamental international law
principle of pacta sunt servanda ("agreements must be respected").
223 See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18
(Feb. 24) (demonstrating the application of equitable principles to resources).
224 See supra Section 4.
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Two obvious areas in which to apply the doctrine are parallel im-
portation and compulsory licensing. These areas have received a
great deal of attention in recent years because of the AIDS epi-
demic and the effect of TRIPS's patent provisions on developing
countries' access to AIDS drugs.
Parallel importation allows countries to seek lower-priced
products abroad. Countries import these products rather than
purchasing higher-priced versions from local distributors. Utiliz-
ing this method, countries are able to "price shop" the price dis-
parities in different countries. The parallel importation principle in
TRIPS-known as exhaustion-provides that "[flor the purposes of
dispute settlement... nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights." 225 Since adopting TRIPS, the United States and the EU
have argued that this language grants patent owners the right to
exclude others from offering to sell or import patented products
into the United States or other countries where the product is un-
der patent protection. 226 In contrast, developing countries contend
that this language supports their right to allow parallel imports.
That noted scholars and experienced trade negotiators could come
to opposite conclusions with regard to this TRIPS clause is evi-
dence that the clause is ambiguous.
Applying the treaty of adhesion doctrine would result in the
clause being construed so as to benefit developing countries (i.e.,
allowing developing countries to establish their own exhaustion
225 TRIPS art. 6.
226 As seen elsewhere:
The legal principle behind parallel importation is exhaustion. Once a
patented product is sold or placed on the market by the patent owner (or
with their consent), the seller no longer has control over the sale (or ex-
port) of that particular product, their rights are "exhausted" by the first
sale of the product. Under national exhaustion, a patent right is ex-
hausted only with respect to the country where the product was placed
on the market. This does not exhaust patent rights in another country.
Thus, for example, if a firm sold a product in India, the firm's rights
would be exhausted in India, (i.e. the buyer could sell the product in In-
dia), but not in Kenya. International exhaustion means that the patent
right is exhausted anywhere in the world when placed on the market
anywhere in the world. The sale of a product in India would allow the
sale of that product in Kenya, without infringing the patent. Regional
exhaustion, which exists in the European Union, means that exhaustion
is relegated to a number of specific countries or region, generally broader
than the national market.
Harris, supra note 10, at 137 n.154 (emphasis in original).
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regime). The TRIPS Council, which administers and monitors the
operation of TRIPS, reached an identical result through a different
approach. 227
A compulsory license is a state-granted license issued to a third
party so that they may manufacture a patented invention without
the patent owner's consent.228 Article 31, the compulsory licensing
provision in TRIPS, provides that government can use compulsory
licensing subject to a number of conditions, including that as a
general rule: (1) an effort should be made to negotiate a voluntary
license on reasonable commercial terms; 229 (2) the government
must provide for "adequate remuneration" to the right holder;230
and (3) the license use must be "predominantly for the supply of
the domestic market."231 The United States further argued for
compulsory licensing under Article 31 to be read together with Ar-
227 This is the result achieved at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference. The
Doha Declaration provides that the TRIPS provisions regarding the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights enable members to design their own rules pertaining
to exhaustion, subject to Articles 3 and 4, which govern most favored nation status
and national treatment. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
228 See PAUL K. GORECKI, REGULATING THE PRICE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN
CANADA: COMPULSORY LICENSING, PRODUCT SELECTION, AND GOVERNMENT
REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMMES 25 (1981) (defining a compulsory license as "an in-
voluntary contract between a willing buyer.., and an unwilling seller . .. im-
posed and enforced by the state.").
229 This requirement may be waived in case of "national emergency," "other
circumstances of extreme urgency," or "in cases of public non-commercial use."
TRIPS art. 31(b). This exception allows a government to bypass the step of nego-
tiating compensation with the patent holder in the interests of expediency. In
2002, Zimbabwe invoked this exception to override patents on antiretroviral
drugs in response to the AIDS crisis gripping the country. Press Release,
Medecins Sans Frontieres, Zimbabwe Government Takes Emergency Action
Against HIV/AIDS (May 29, 2002), http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/
invoke.cfm?objectid=74452575-A024-48E7-A499C6808624B57C&component=
toolkit.article&method=fullhtml&CFID=2000923&CFTOKEN=63291554.
230 TRIPS art. 31(f), (h).
231 As mentioned throughout, there are many exceptions to the general rules,
including situations in which a license is used in non-commercial situations.
Other conditions include: (1) the scope and duration of the license must be limited
to the purpose of the authorization; (2) the license is non-exclusive and is gener-
ally non-transferable; (3) the license is terminated when "the circumstances which
led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur;" and (4) the government's deci-
sion is subject to independent judicial review. Id. art. 31(c), (f). Still other bases
for compulsory licenses include the need to correct anti-competitive practices and
in preventing blocking patents. Id. art. 31(k), (1).
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ticle 27.1232- this would prevent member countries from being able
to protect public health and ensure their citizens' access to critical
medicine.233 Developing countries argued for a less restrictive in-
terpretation, one that would allow the compulsory licensing provi-
sion to be read against the backdrop of the treaty's objectives and
principles, which would in turn allow developing countries to de-
termine the grounds on which such licenses may be issued.
234
Since this provision also seems ambiguous, reading this provi-
sion in light of adhesion principles would mandate a reading con-
sistent with the interpretation leveled by developing countries.
This would allow those countries to import drugs without restric-
tions under a compulsory license and allow countries with manu-
facturing capabilities to produce these drugs for developing coun-
tries, including situations in which the goods are not placed on the
market by, or with the consent of, the patent holders. Again, WTO
members resolved this ambiguity by adopting an interpretive deci-
sion consistent with the treaty of adhesion approach.
235
Another obvious area where WTO members could apply the
doctrine is in interpreting the entire treaty in light of TRIPS Articles
7 and 8. Article 7 states that:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of tech-
nology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to so-
cial and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations. 23
6
The objectives contained in Article 7 have two pillars: to pro-
mote inventions and to disseminate technology embodied in such
inventions. The principles of the treaty are contained in Article
232 Article 27.1 provides: "patents shall be available and patent rights enjoy-
able without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology
and whether products are imported or locally produced." See id. art. 27.
233 James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 291, 297 (2002).
234 Id.
235 The decision allows a WTO member to manufacture patented medicines
under a compulsory license for export to certain developing and least-developed
countries. General Council Decision, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Dec-
laration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2 2003).
236 TRIPS art. 7.
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8.237 These principles include, inter alia, the ability of countries to
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and promote the
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development and to prevent the abuse
of intellectual property rights or practices that adversely affect the
international transfer of technology.
The WTO Panel has yet to fully address Articles 7 and 8,
though in Canada Pharmaceuticals, the AB stated that its findings
did not "in any way prejudge the applicability of Article 7 or Arti-
cle 8 of the TRIPS Agreement in possible future cases with respect
to measures to promote the policy objectives of the WTO
[mlembers that are set out in those Articles. Those Articles still
await appropriate interpretation." 238
Discussions in the TRIPS Council have focused only on
whether members have implemented their TRIPS obligations relat-
ing to the minimum standards of protection. Rather than being an
agreement that balances developing countries' concerns about
technology transfer and promoting the public interest against de-
veloped countries' concern for protecting intellectual property
rights, it has instead been converted into a means of enforcing pri-
vate rights -irrespective of the impact that protecting these rights
has on sectors of vital importance to developing countries. Prior to
the Doha negotiations, developing countries' concern about incor-
porating the treaty's objectives and principles, such as to accom-
modate competing public values, were not discussed. 239 As the In-
237 Members may "adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nu-
trition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development" when creating or amending their
laws, so long as any new laws do not contradict the agreement. Id. art. 8.1. Arti-
cle 8.2 holds that "[aippropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellec-
tual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices, which unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology." Id. art.
8.2.
238 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, 101,
WT/DS170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
239 This of course excludes the discussion at the Doha negotiations related to
developing countries' access to essential medicines. For developing country pro-
posals requesting effective implementation of Articles 7 and 8, see, e.g., Commu-
nication from Kenya on Behalf of the African Group -Preparations for the 1999
Ministerial Conference, WT/GC/W/302 (Aug. 6, 1999), which cites the African
Groups' concerns on, and proposals for, the TRIPS Council's review of TRIPS
provisions. See also Communication from Kenya -Preparations for the 1999 Minis-
terial Conference, WT/GC/W/233 (July 5, 1999) (listing Kenya's proposals for "the
improvement of the [WTO agreements] ... to bring about a degree of balance in
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dian delegation lamented "[c]learly, the transfer and dissemination
of technology and the consequential increase in trade have been of
little concern to the questioning Members." In fact, during many
negotiating rounds, some developed countries proposed further
strengthening intellectual property rights, again with little regard
to overarching public interest concerns. After the Doha negotia-
tions, things improved only slightly, with the Council merely giv-
ing lip service to the objectives and principles set forth in Articles 7
and 8 and relegating them to secondary importance as compared
to the minimum standards of intellectual property protection.240
In future cases, the WTO Panel and AB must give weight to the
objectives and principles of TRIPS to encourage, among other
things, technology transfer. They can achieve this through the
treaty of adhesion doctrine. More specifically, the objectives and
principles of the treaty assist in balancing the private rights of in-
ventors with the rights of an invention's users. In any debate over
TRIPS, therefore, WTO Panels and the AB must recognize and pre-
serve these objectives and principles.241 They can do so by circum-
scribing intellectual property rights protection with competing
public values embodied in Articles 7 and 8.242 WTO Panels and the
AB can read Articles 7 and 8 as overarching provisions that should
qualify, rather than be circumscribed by, other TRIPS provisions.
243
them"); Communication from India-Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Confer-
ence, WT/GC/W/225 (July 2, 1999) (citing India's issues and proposals for the
TRIPS Agreement); Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, and
Honduras -Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, WT/GC/W/209 Uune
17, 1999) (listing some challenges that developing countries are facing in adapting
to the TRIPS Agreement); Communication from India -Preparations for the 1999
Ministerial Conference, WT/GC/W/147 (Feb. 18, 1999) (listing some of India's is-
sues relating to the TRIPS Agreement).
240 Rather than recognizing the significance of Articles 7 and 8, the Panel lim-
ited their application by mentioning them as two of many provisions that relate to
TRIPS' object and purpose. Even further, the Panel focused on the limitations of
these Articles, further reducing their effectiveness.
241 Communication from India- Clarifying TRIPS: A Confidence-Building
Measure, IP/C/W/214 (Oct. 6, 2000).
242 Id.
243 The clause "provided that such measures are consistent with the provi-
sions of this Agreement" included in Article 8 can be read to negate the principles
contained in that Article. Reading Article 8 more favorably to developing coun-
tries, however, mandates an interpretation of the Article that will not allow this
clause to completely negate the principles of technology transfer contained
therein. TRIPS art. 8.
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Further, Articles 7 and 8 should be read in conjunction with Ar-
ticle 66, which requires developed countries to provide incentives
to their businesses and institutions in order to encourage technol-
ogy transfers to developing countries so as to "create a sound and
viable technological base." 244 All members recognize that technol-
ogy transfers are vital for economic growth. Failure to allow tech-
nology transfers will lead to a further widening of the technology
chasm that exists between developed and developing countries.
Yet, as the required annual reports on the implementation of Arti-
cle 66.2 plainly reveal, technology transfers have not materialized
to the extent foreseen. 245 This result stems from the Article being
couched in "best endeavor" terms. As the African Group com-
plained: "Best endeavor provisions are fundamentally flawed in
that they are neither enforceable nor do they constitute a real bene-
fit for developing and least-developed countries."246 A more nu-
anced reading of Articles 7 and 8, as would be done under a treaty
of adhesion analysis, would give more "bite" to Article 66.2 as
well.
Yet another area where the WTO can utilize the treaty of adhe-
sion doctrine is in interpreting the limitations and exceptions
TRIPS sets for copyrights, trademarks, and patents.247 The excep-
244 Article 66.2 provides: "Developed country Members shall provide incen-
tives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promot-
ing and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base." Id. art.
66.2.
245 See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Report, European Communities -Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS
Agreement, IP/C/W/431/Add.3 (Jan. 7, 2005) (documenting efforts to promote
technology transfer in the European Communities); Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Report, United States -Implementation of
Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement: Information from Developed Country Mem-
bers, IP/C/W/388/Add.7 (Feb. 4, 2003) (describing the efforts of the United
States to promote technology transfer).
246 Communication from Kenya on Behalf of the African Group -Preparations
for the 1999 Ministerial Conference the TRIPS Agreement, WT/GC/W/302 (Aug. 6,
1999) (listing "the key issues of interest to the [African Group]," including "pro-
posals on how these difficulties should be resolved").
247 See TRIPS arts. 13, 17, 30. Some have noted that particular patent terms
(e.g., "prior art," "novelty," "inventive step," "industrial applicability," drafting
and interpretation of patent claims, and the sufficiency of the disclosure accom-
panying a patent application) are open to different interpretations that may give
room for developing countries to maneuver. All of these involve basic legal prin-
ciples underlying the application for and granting of patents and can have pro-
found effects on a country's patent regime. These are but a few areas where the
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tions and limitations contained in Articles 13, 17, and 30 must sat-
isfy a tripartite test, in which such exceptions and limitations must:
(1) be "limited"; (2) not "unreasonably conflict with normal exploi-
tation" of the intellectual property right in question; and (3) not
"unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests" of the rights
owner, "taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
In Canada-Pharmaceuticals Patents, the WTO Panel interpreted
Article 30 from the perspective of the right holders, disregarding
the policy goals or social purposes of the measure; they did this de-
spite stating that the exceptions should be read in light of Articles 7
and 8.248 As to two of the conditions ("unreasonably prejudice"
and "unreasonably conflict"), the panel evaluated the exception
exclusively in light of the economic impact on the rights holder.
As to the first condition ("limited"), the panel focused on the extent
the rights holders' legal right was curtailed. 249 In future decisions,
WTO panels must construe exceptions and limitations more in fa-
vor of developing countries, bearing in mind Articles 7 and 8. This
will provide developing countries with greater discretion and
flexibility to allow for exceptions to exclusive rights. Again, this
can be accomplished through applying the treaty of adhesion doc-
trine to construe any asserted exception in light of developing
countries' needs and goals, rather than clarifying the ambiguity to
vindicate the rights holders' economic interests.
The examples above represent but a few areas where the treaty
of adhesion doctrine may be applied. The examples are illustra-
tive, not exhaustive. The doctrine can - and should - be applied in
interpreting other ambiguous TRIPS provisions.
6. COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS
This final section seeks to address critiques of the treaty of ad-
hesion doctrine. Criticisms are grouped into two categories. One
category relates to whether it is appropriate to apply a treaty of
adhesion doctrine to international treaties such as TRIPS. The
doctrine can be applied. Of course, WTO members could apply the adhesion doc-
trine to interpret all ambiguous provisions.
248 Panel Report, Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 7.26,
WT/DS114/R, (Mar. 17, 2000) ("Both the goals and the limitations stated in Arti-
cles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind when [defining the scope of Arti-
cle 30] as well as those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which indicate
its object and purposes.").
249 Id.
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other category relates to whether TRIPS is in fact a treaty of adhe-
sion.
6.1. Criticisms Regarding Whether it is Appropriate to Apply the
Treaty of Adhesion Doctrine to International Treaties and TRIPS
6.1.1. Application of the doctrine amounts to judicial activism
Some might argue that applying the treaty of adhesion doctrine
to TRIPS is inappropriate because, as Kelly suggests, doing so
amounts to WTO judicial activism, which would allow WTO pan-
els and the AB to rewrite TRIPS provisions and alter members'
rights and obligations. Kelly's primary concern would be that in
rewriting TRIPS through this new interpretive doctrine, WTO pan-
els and, as a result, developing countries would avoid the democ-
ratic framework of the WTO and undo previously negotiated
deals. Kelly's point on democratic accountability is well taken.
However, his argument is based on the fundamental assumption
that TRIPS was the product of a democratic bargaining process,
where all countries participated in policy decisions affecting their
rights. This was not the case. Democratic process suggests an abil-
ity by people or states to participate in governance and in the proc-
ess by which decisions are made. If, as is posited throughout this
article, developing countries were absent in the negotiation proc-
ess, the democratic negotiation referred to by Kelly was non-
existent. Allowing the WTO judicial body to consider deficiencies
in the negotiation process can both account for the lack of mean-
ingful participation and better ensure democratic accountability. 250
Moreover, WTO panels are already called upon to interpret
TRIPS. The doctrine does not invalidate the treaty nor does it al-
low WTO jurists to rewrite provisions. Rather, jurists are only
called upon to apply the doctrine in a limited manner, when inter-
preting ambiguous TRIPS provisions. This can-and should-be
done within the parameters of members' existing rights and obliga-
tions.
250 See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 1, at 83 ("The right to democracy is the right of
people to be consulted and to participate in the process by which political values
are reconciled and choices made.").
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6.1.2. The doctrine is not a general principle of law
Another possible criticism against applying the doctrine is that
the doctrine is not a general principle of law recognized by civi-
lized nations as suitable for application on an international level.
This could be either because it is not found in a sufficient number
of domestic legal systems, or because it is inappropriate for appli-
cation in international law. The first criticism is not troublesome.
A comprehensive review of the world's legal systems, while desir-
able, is impracticable here. This article does, however, review a
wide range of countries across various cultures and at different
economic and technological stages of development, each possess-
ing different philosophical foundations. The second criticism is
more troubling. In truth, it may be the most significant hurdle of
all.
Admittedly, general principles comprise a very narrow cate-
gory of international law and are treated with suspicion. Schachter
argues that this is so both because they allow too much room for
subjectivity and because "they introduce standards that may su-
persede State needs and goals." 251 Above, it was reasoned that the
doctrine amounts to a general principle because of its importance
and centrality to the rule of law as well as its consistency with
other rules of international law. Beyond this, the doctrine may
have indirect influence as an indication of policy and principles.
252
Recognizing that the current of law may run in the opposite direc-
tion of the doctrine may be enough to change that tide.
6.2 Criticisms Regarding Whether TRIPS is a Treaty of Adhesion
The second line of possible attack against the treaty of adhesion
doctrine concerns whether TRIPS is a treaty of adhesion at all.
Here, some might argue that TRIPS was produced as a result of
bargaining among sovereign and equal states, all having the capac-
ity to conclude treaties. Thus, the coercion necessary to support a
treaty of adhesion argument is lacking. Moreover, TRIPS was the
result of a larger WTO package that included trade-offs in areas
other than and including intellectual property, making the adop-
tion of TRIPS less one-sided than it perhaps seems. Put simply,
251 SCHACHTER ET AL., supra note 31, at 49.
252 See, e.g., id. at 52 (citing a case in which the law of trusts "may possibly
have had an indirect influence on the [International] Court's reasoning in its advi-
sory opinions").
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this argument postulates that TRIPS was the product of conven-
tional treaty negotiation, no different than a myriad of other trea-
ties.
It is a mistake to view treaty negotiation as bargaining among
equally sovereign states. The reality is what Philip Jessup long ago
observed as the "inescapable fact of power differentials" among
states.253 And, as we acknowledge power differentials among in-
dividuals and corporations, it is time not only to acknowledge, but
to account for the power differentials among countries. Thus, for-
mal equality of states cannot sustain the argument against the
treaty of adhesion doctrine. 254
Neither, however, can the inequality of states alone sustain an
argument supporting the treaty of adhesion doctrine. Treaties al-
ways involve bargaining among states of unequal bargaining
power. The lopsidedness of agreements, as a result of unequal
bargaining power between states, has not traditionally been con-
sidered an impediment to their validity under traditional interna-
tional law.255 Aust observes that the concept of unequal or "Leo-
nine" treaties has never been accepted in international law. As he
states: "No two states are ever equal, and to allow a state to avoid
its treaty obligations on this ground could undermine the stability
of treaty relations." 256 Dunoff and others similarly make this point:
Of course, the equality of states is juridical only. As a prac-
tical matter, states vary enormously in size, resources,
population, military capacity, and economic strength.
These disparities necessarily place some states in stronger
bargaining positions than others in the negotiation of par-
ticular treaties. As a general matter, such inequalities do
not preclude the conclusion of a valid treaty any more than
similar inequalities in the bargaining positions of private
parties preclude the formation of valid private contracts.25 7
253 PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 30 (1948).
254 Most traditional international law scholars recognize that formal equality
of sovereignty of states does not translate into a legal requisite of material, or sub-
stantive, equality of power, wealth, technology, or other values possessed by
countries. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 122, at 257.
255 Werner Morvav, Unequal Treaties, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 514, 514-16 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984) (referring to treaties
signed by a weak Chinese government that were upheld under customary law).
256 AUST, supra note 122, at 257.
257 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 46, at 46.
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This article does not advance a theory based solely on the ine-
quality of states. As in the domestic context, the doctrine applies in
situations that involve both inequalities in the bargaining positions
of the parties and an additional element, such as unfair surprise or
oppression. Whether that "additional something" is adequately
demonstrated here is another issue.
258
Because the treaty of adhesion doctrine requires more than a
mere inequality of bargaining position among states, it will not ap-
ply to or unravel every treaty previously negotiated. Indeed, the
doctrine should be available for other treaties. However, TRIPS is
unique among treaties and it is not likely that the doctrine would
apply elsewhere.
TRIPS is exceptional for a number of reasons. First, the treaty
is far reaching, affecting various sectors vital to a country, includ-
ing health services, human rights, and economic and technological
development. Second, TRIPS significantly altered previous intel-
lectual property regimes by mandating taxing minimum levels of
protection beyond previous levels and supplementing this with a
well-organized enforcement mechanism, introducing a new dis-
pute settlement procedure and reverse consensus rule "unique in
the history of interstate dispute resolution."25 9  Pre-TRIPS ar-
rangements left considerable flexibility to developing countries to
determine domestic intellectual property policy for the public and
private benefit of their constituents. TRIPS represents a radical
change, unlike the gradual change in the domestic law of the
United States and other developed countries. Even though now
couched in trade terms, trade theory supported the old GATT be-
cause it focused on "negative integration." 260 Again, TRIPS is radi-
cally different because it is not supported by trade theory -in par-
ticular, the theory of comparative advantage. Thus, TRIPS raises
258 There is an important exception to the treaty of adhesion doctrine. As ar-
ticulated above, treaties of adhesion could arguably encompass peace treaties.
Clearly, however, peace treaties, negotiated to end wars and global armed con-
flict, are not included in treaty of adhesion analysis, because treaties that end seri-
ous and widespread human rights violations and repair the torn fabric of the in-
ternational society do not create the harms that the treaty of adhesion doctrine
seeks to prevent.
259 DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 46, at 784. The "reverse consensus" rule, which
essentially reverses the GATT consensus rule, makes all requests for a panel, re-
quests to adopt panel reports, and requests to adopt appellate reports automatic
unless there is a consensus by all WTO members against such a request. Id.
260 See generally JAN TINBERGERN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
(1965) (discussing negative integration and positive integration).
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questions about its suitability from an economic standpoint. Fi-
nally, as mentioned throughout, a disturbing number of develop-
ing countries were simply absent from TRIPS negotiations, which
is all the more problematic because there is no alternative-
members had no choice but to accept TRIPS on its terms.
Those who view the TRIPS negotiation process as a bargaining
process between sovereigns might also point to the concessions
developed countries made to developing countries. These conces-
sions include the five- and ten-year transitional periods for devel-
oping and least developed countries, respectively,261 and declara-
tions in the stated objectives and principles in Articles 7 and 8.262
Developing countries also obtained enhanced trade concessions in
the areas of textiles and agriculture.
With respect to the transitional periods, it is absurd to believe
that five and ten years will make any impression on the impact of
TRIPS.263 There is little disagreement that TRIPS harms developing
countries in the short term; 264 in the long term, there also is very lit-
tle credible evidence suggesting that TRIPS will benefit developing
countries once fully implemented.265
Still further, even though TRIPS is one of "three pillars" of
WTO agreements, along with the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS") and the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in
261 TRIPS arts. 65-66.
262 Id. arts. 7-8.
263 Under TRIPS, least developed countries were required to comply by Janu-
ary 2006. This was extended to 2016 by the Doha Declaration. See Doha Declara-
tion, supra note 227 ("We also agree that least-developed country Members will
not be obliged, with respect to pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply
Sections 5 [Patents] and 7 [Protection of Undisclosed Information] of Part II of the
TRIPS Agreement or to enforce rights provided for under these Sections until 1
January 2016 ... ").
264 Even scholars in favor of strong intellectual property protection recognize
that developing countries do not benefit from TRIPS in the short term. See, e.g.,
Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 279, 315 (2004)
(acknowledging the "overall social and economic costs of compliance" with "in-
ternational minimum standards" for developing countries).
265 Drahos, supra note 179, at 29 ("The ten years given to LDCs under TRIPS
to enact and enforce fully functioning systems of copyright, patent, trademarks is
not particularly generous, especially given that the development effects of doing
so are anything but clear."); see also Harris, supra note 10, at 109 ("The perceived
long-term benefits have not yet materialized and indeed are questionable.").
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Goods, the two other agreements were not as critical to the success-
ful completion of Uruguay Round.266
Regarding trade-offs, the argument is as follows: TRIPS is not
as one-sided and oppressive as the tale above suggests. Rather,
TRIPS is a bargained contract where, in exchange for strengthening
and enforcing intellectual property protection, developing coun-
tries received liberalization of international trade in textiles and
apparel through the phasing-out of the Multifiber Arrangements
and trade in agricultural products that would confer export bene-
fits. 267 However, TRIPS was so inequitably weighted and the ad-
vantages to developing countries so grossly disproportionate to the
obligations placed on them that this nonetheless runs afoul of the
adhesion doctrine.
For developing countries, TRIPS results in, among other things:
(1) lack of access to products; (2) loss of revenue; (3) loss of em-
ployment with the loss of pirate industries; (4) political fallout; and
(5) the additional costs of implementing the new system. The ac-
cess to developed world markets for textiles and agriculture is not
commensurate with these costs. Moreover, the access to these
markets has not yet materialized. In the decade since the imple-
mentation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ("ATC"), the
United States has been woefully deficient in meeting its obliga-
tions. In fact, of a total of 937 quotas applied by the United States
on imports of textiles and clothing products from WTO members
under the Multifiber Arrangements, the United States had phased
out only 103 as of 2004, a mere 11% of the original total.268
Further, trade concessions in exchange for greater market ac-
cess for agriculture, textiles, and value-added goods were not all
that the developing countries "bargained" for. As part of the WTO
deal, developing countries agreed to have bound tariffs, which
made it difficult to protect domestic industries, and investment
measures through the Trade Related Aspects of Investment Meas-
266 See generally JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS (1986).
267 See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreements, Annex
1A; L. & Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana) 27, 27 (Mar. 1995) (petitioning devel-
oped countries to take into account the "particular needs and conditions" of de-
veloping countries in increasing markets for their agricultural products); Agree-
ment on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreements, Annex; L. &
Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana) 77, 77 (Mar. 1995) ("[S]pecial treatment should
be accorded to the least-developed countr[ies].").
268 See Communication from India, supra note 241.
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ures ("TRIMS"), which granted foreign investors greater access to
traditionally state-operated industries. In the end, the argument
that TRIPS was the result of a bargain rather than coercion is un-
convincing.
6.3. Practical Reasons Not to Apply the Doctrine
There also may be arguments concerning the doctrine's limita-
tions in analytical reach and practical political usefulness. One
such argument is that applying the doctrine will be an exercise in
futility, as the United States and other developed countries will cir-
cumvent any adverse interpretation by resorting to unilateral pres-
sures outside TRIPS to obtain the same or greater obligations from
developing countries. Indeed, the United States has done so in
seeking to strengthen TRIPS by entering into bilateral and regional
trade agreements that contain "TRIPS plus" standards.
269
This is neither a cynical nor an insignificant argument; rather, it
reflects the reality underscored earlier that more powerful nations
assert influence over less powerful ones. Nevertheless, to the ex-
tent that certain TRIPS outcomes are surprising and oppressive,
developing countries can avoid such outcomes under the doctrine
of adhesion. They could also avoid similar outcomes in future ne-
gotiations. Under the doctrine of adhesion, they can enter agree-
ments "with eyes wide open." This may embolden them in future
negotiations. This is consistent with the counter-hegemonic chal-
lenges to TRIPS now appearing. 270 Additionally, developing coun-
tries can negotiate in the shadow of these new interpretive WTO
269 For an example of a "TRIPS plus" agreement, see Central American Free
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Dominican Republic, art. 15, Aug. 5, 2005, available at
www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/
SectionIndex.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (providing for, among other things,
extensions of patent terms, grace periods, and other protections exceeding those
of the TRIPS Agreement).
270 Sell discusses the emergence of such challenges:
[Als the impact of TRIPS has become more palpable, new pockets of re-
sistance and social mobilization have emerged to challenge TRIPS. With
the exception of initial developing country resistance to moving IP issues
from WIPO to GATT, opposition to TRIPS emerged rather late-when
the ink was dry. This implies that while TRIPS cannot be 'undone' in
any direct sense, the fight over loopholes, alternative interpretations of
vague language, and perhaps, most importantly, effective resistance to
further expansion of global IP rights are on the horizon.
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW, supra note 188, at 121.
[Vol. 27:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss3/2
TRIPS AND TREATIES OF ADHESION
decisions in view of the treaty of adhesion doctrine bringing about
favorable outcomes.
6.4. Practical Reasons to Apply the Doctrine
In addition to the legal arguments outlined above, there are
also practical reasons why the WTO should incorporate and apply
the treaty of adhesion doctrine. The proposal does not disrupt
other assumptions in international law. It is consistent with keep-
ing treaties entact and with binding parties to their obligations. It
also has roots in the VCLT provisions on duress and coercion.
Equally important, the doctrine may actually ensure more compli-
ance with TRIPS and WTO obligations.
The WTO is a compliance institution concerned with sustaining
cooperation in face of dynamic change. Fairness and distributive
justice -or at least the perception of fairness and distributive jus-
tice- are essential elements in ensuring the stability of treaties: "A
collaboration that is perceived by a participant as blatantly unfair
cannot be a durable arrangement in international society." 271
Moreover, WTO judicial bodies decide cases with due regard to
their own institutional interests. 272 They therefore shape decisions
to encourage compliance and consensus. 273 The Doha negotiations
271 SCHACHTER ET AL., supra note 31, at 61. See also FRANCK, supra note 1, at 8
("[T]he perception that a rule or system of rules is distributively fair [that the con-
sequences of the rule are just], like the perception of its legitimacy [that rules are
made and applied in accordance with what parties perceive as the right process],
also encourages voluntary compliance."). Fairness and distributive justice are not
the only matters that ensure compliance; lerley identifies a number of factors.
Douglas Jerley argues that factors include:
(1) the dramatic influence ... of developed countries on the dispute set-
tlement process; (2) the [system's] effectiveness ... in resolving disputes
between countries of diverging.., power; (3) the non-compliance of de-
veloped countries with WTO decisions; (4) the lack of recourse to retalia-
tion; and (5) the lack of... resources.., to file and defend against com-
plaints.
Douglas lerley, Defining the Factors That Influence Developing Country Compliance
with and Participation in the TO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the Dis-
pute Over Bananas, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 615, 616 (2002).
272 Shaffer, supra note 201, at 131 ("WTO judicial bodies, as any court, exercise
institutional power when they decide legal cases.").
273 Id. See also James McCall Smith, WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of
Procedure in Appellate Body Rulings, in 2 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 65, 67 (Richard
Blackhurst ed., 2003) ("[T]he way in which the Appellate Body -through a series
of strategic procedural moves that promote consensus decision making, broaden
its access to information, and preserve its judicial discretion-has improved the
odds of the DSU's survival and future development.").
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and the subsequent Doha Declaration (the "Declaration") can be
seen as a step in this direction. The Declaration embraced a moral
fairness interpretation of TRIPS and, arguably, is an invitation to
take this a step further; the treaty of adhesion doctrine provides a
vehicle to accomplish just that.
274
6.5. Possible Problems in Applying the Doctrine
This final section is included to note some possible problems
with the doctrine. Two interrelated problems come to mind. First,
which developing countries should be able to take advantage of
the doctrine? As developed throughout this article, the doctrine
should be available only to those countries that meet the conditions
outlined above (i.e., those that did not fully participate, had no
meaningful choice, suffered surprise or oppression, and were in
unequal bargaining positions). Certainly, India, Brazil, and other
larger developing countries not only participated in the negotia-
tions but also are not in the "unequal bargaining position" that
many African nations are in. As such, the doctrine should not ap-
ply to them.275
Only by participating in the WTO dispute settlement system
will developing countries make use of the doctrine and influence
the interpretation of TRIPS. Thus far, their participation has been
minimal.276 Indeed, "the majority of developing country WTO
274 The legal effect of the Doha Declaration is not clear. For arguments that it
is a legal decision of WTO members equivalent to an interpretation of TRIPS, see
Abbott, supra note 8, at 490-504 (describing the "legal effects" of Doha). See also
Gathii, supra note 233, at 292-93 (arguing that "the Doha Declaration should now
be regarded as an interpretive element in the interpretation of the TRIPS agree-
ment under customary international law").
275 However, this raises another concern. Applying the doctrine to different
countries may result in different TRIPS interpretations.
276 Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for
Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in ICTSD Re-
source Paper No. 5, TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTivE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM AT THE WTO 1, 13-14 (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable De-
velopment, March 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ ictsdseries/
resource_papers/DSU_2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) (noting that, according
to one scholar, "developing countries 'are one-third less likely to file complaints
against developed states under the WTO than they were under the post-1989
GATT-regime"'). Shaffer notes that other than Brazil and India, developing coun-
tries are less likely to participate actively in WTO litigation because of "structural
factors." These include: "(i) individual developing countries' relatively smaller
value, volume and variety of exports, resulting in fewer economies of scale in mo-
bilizing legal resources, and (ii) the high cost of access to the system." Id. at 15.
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members [has] never participated" and no least developed country
has ever initiated a WTO complaint.277 The treaty of adhesion doc-
trine should, however, give developing countries more incentive to
participate in the WTO process.
7. CONCLUSION
The WTO is under attack from all sides. Protests at trade
rounds and increasing criticism against the WTO and TRIPS can-
not be ignored. The WTO must make an effort to include develop-
ing countries such that they "feel that they have a real voice in
making the decisions that affect them." 278 Allowing the inequities
in the bargaining process and the onerous one-sided provisions in
TRIPS to be recognized in WTO dispute settlement resolution is a
start. So, too, is incorporating a treaty of adhesion doctrine in in-
ternational law.
The doctrine will allow WTO judicial bodies to interpret am-
biguous TRIPS provisions in favor of developing countries, thus
injecting fairness into international law. While there may be ten-
sions between infusing international law with fairness and the real-
politik of international law, international intercourse and the stabil-
ity of international relationships depend on a new focus on
fairness.
277 Id. at 14.
278 Steger, supra note 143, at 141.
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